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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE
JOHN D. COPELAND*
Introduction
The federal environmental criminal enforcement program began in the mid- to
late 1970s when the Department of Justice (DOJ) undertook some well-publicized
prosecutions for environmental violations. The DOJ also created an environmental
crimes section devoted exclusively to criminal prosecutions under the federal
environmental protection laws.'
It was not, however, until the mid-1980s that the federal criminal enforcement
program became aggressive. Increased public concern over the environment
encouraged Congress to enact new environmental crimes provisions. At the request
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress added new environmental
crimes to existing statutes and significantly increased environmental criminal
provisions already on the books. In addition, the EPA was given new investigatory
powers and additional resources directed towards the criminal prosecution effort.'
Many of the changes enacted by Congress were part of the Pollution Prosecution
Act of 1990.3 The criminal enforcement of environmental laws is now viewed as
a national priority
Twenty-five years ago, none of the major environmental laws in effect contained
significant criminal enforcement provisions. But not today. Severe criminal
sanctions can now be found in every major piece of environmental legislation.
There are those, such as Dick Thornburgh, former United States Attorney General,
who favor increased criminal sanctions:
We clearly have set new standards as to which acts of pollution are
criminal, both socially and legally. If we are to continue to move
* Director of the National Center for Agricultural Law Research and Information, and Research
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. B.A. 1971, University of Texas
at Arlington, J.D. 1974, Southern Methodist University School of Law, LL.M. 1986, University of
Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville.
1. Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection Into Legal Rules and the Problem With
Environmental Crime, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 867, 869 (1994).
2. Id. at 869-70.
3. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, §§ 201-205, 104 Stat. 2954, 2962-63
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988)).
4. Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO.
WVASH. L. REV. 889 (1991); Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws-A National
Priority, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775 (1991); Earl Devaney, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws: An EPA Perspective, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 32.
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forward in our efforts to restore our environment and preserve it in as
near a pristine condition as possible, we must continue to raise those
standards until no citizen thinks it is acceptable to throw trash from a
car, no factory finds a greater reward in polluting than in cleaning up,
and no corporate executive believes illegal dumping of toxic waste is a
sound business decision. Our long-term goal, therefore, must be to
continue to set an ever-higher standard of protecting our environment
from criminal depredation.'
Agricultural activities put farmers, ranchers and agribusinesses at risk as to
environmental violations. Raising livestock, plowing, clearing land, draining water
off property, repairing levees, fencing property, clearing draining ditches, using
pesticides and other chemicals, controlling predators, harvesting, storing and
processing crops6 can all potentially expose a farmer, rancher or agribusiness to
criminal prosecution for environmental crimes.
The exposure of farmers, ranchers, and agribusinesses to criminal prosecutions
is increased by the actions of some environmental groups which seem to be
inherently hostile to modem agricultural operations and issue reports highly critical
of agriculture's impact on the environment. For example, the Environmental
Working Group (Group) has in the past year issued two reports blaming agriculture
for the contamination of the drinking water of 14 million people! On October 18,
1994, the Group issued a report entitled Tap Water Blues' which was touted as the
first comprehensive analysis of herbicides in drinking water. The report concluded
that the contamination of drinking water by herbicides is "a serious public health
issue."9
Although the EPA said that the Group's report exceeded the EPA's own analysis
of unacceptable levels of herbicides in drinking water, EPA Administrator Carol M.
Browner went on to describe the study as "another in a series of wake-up calls
telling us that we can no longer take for granted that every water system is safe all
the time."'" The American Crop Association was more direct in its criticism of Tap
Water Blues. The Association pointed out that farmers and ranchers have adopted
a wide variety of pollution prevention practices to significantly reduce agriculture's
impact on water quality. The Association issued a press release asking, "Why has
the Environmental Working Group chosen to unnecessarily attempt to scare the
public again?""
5. Thornburgh, supra note 4, at 780.
6. Sweet corn husks may be considered a hazardous substance under Michigan's Environmental
Response Act according to a Michigan appeals court. The husks fermented while being stored in a feed
bunker located near a stream. The husks allegedly produced 1.3 million gallons of leachate that flowed
into a lake, killing aquatic life. Cipri v. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc., 539 N.W.2d 526 (1995).
7. Farm Herbicides Pollute Water Sources of 14 Million People, Two Groups Report, 25 Env't




1I. Id. at 1224-25.
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On August 17, 1995, the Environmental Working Group issued another report
blaming agriculture for water pollution. In Weed Killers by the Glass: A Citizen's
Tap Water Monitoring Project in 29 Cities, the Group concluded that herbicide
contamination in twenty-nine Midwest cities sometimes exceeded federal standards
for weeks and months during agricultural seasons. 2 Once again, the EPA put some
distance between itself and the Group's report. EPA officials expressed concern
about the methodology of the study. At the same time, EPA officials also expressed
some praise for the report 3 and a number of EPA water quality studies blame
agriculture for at least one-half of the nations water quality problems. 4 In addition,
the public has expressed its concerns over agriculture's use of chemicals. 5
The conclusion is inescapable that agriculture is no longer viewed as a benign
activity and has become a target defendant in civil and criminal actions. 6 There
already existed numerous examples of federal and state criminal prosecutions of
farmers, ranchers, and agribusinesses, as indicated by the following:
- Frank C. Alegre, a prominent trucker and rancher in the San Joaquin Valley of
California, was charged by a federal grand jury with long-term pollution of the San
Joaquin river and adjacent wetlands. According to an affidavit filed by an
investigator with the Army Corps of Engineers, Alegre, without the required permit,
dumped broken concrete, dirt, and other debris into wetlands on property adjacent
to the river. Alegre contended that erosion was washing away his ranch and that it
had been reduced from 318 acres to 275 acres.
7
- A Minnesota farmer was fined $45,000 for filling in a one-acre glacial pothole
that made farming his property difficult. Besides fining the farmer, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers made him dig the fill material out of the pothole. 8
- State officials took action against an eastern Iowa farmer accused of killing
more than 170,000 fish by siphoning livestock sewage into a prime trout stream.
The farmer, Eldon Waller, siphoned up to four inches of liquid from his hog and
cattle manure lagoon onto his land near the mouth of the creek. Waller told officials
he thought the water was clean, but officials said it depleted oxygen in the stream.
Waller faces up to two years in jail and $50,000 in fines. 9
12. Environmental Group's Report on Pesticides in Drinking Water Distorts Risks, Official Says,
26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 865, 865-66 (Sept. 1, 1995).
13. Id.
14. See EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1992 REPORT TO CONGRESS (1994); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, INFORMATION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT AND
WATER QUALITY ISSUES 8-9 (1995); U.S. DEP't OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS 60-61 (1994).
15. Public Poll: Pesticides Top List of National Concerns, NAT L FARM FIN. NEws, Aug. 3, 1990,
at 10.
16. Farm Wastewater Blamed for Wildlife Deaths at Salton Sea, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1995,
at B4.
17. Denny Walsh, Rancher Faces U.S. Charges, Accused of Polluting Wetlands, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 24, 1994, at BI.
18. Walter Williams, Here's How Congress Meddles in Our Lives, CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 2, 1994,
at E03.
19. Fish Kill to Stir Legal Action, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 30, 1993, at 8C.
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0 The EPA proposed a $49,500 fine against a Tipton County, Tennessee farmer
who cleared and drained acreage that agency officials called "functional and
valuable wetlands." According to the EPA, J.E. Warren, seventy-four, of the Quito
Community in Tennessee, cleared trees and dug ditches across a tract containing up
to eighty acres of wetlands. The digging was done between 1988 and 1990. The
clearing took place on bottom land near the Mississippi river and some thirty miles
upstream from Memphis. According to the EPA, Warren failed to apply for the
federal Clean Water Act permit."
- An Indianola, Iowa fanner was fined $15,000 and placed on probation for one
year for negligently dumping hog waste into the South River. The defendant
admitted his responsibility for the pollution, but argued "extenuating circumstances."
He said the state fell behind in approving a permit for a new lagoon to be built for
hog waste. The defendant contended that a state environmental official refused the
defendant's permission to use the new lagoon when the two older lagoons filled.
Instead of using the new lagoon, the defendant was instructed to spread the waste
on farmland. Wet soil conditions allegedly led to the pollution. The defendant was
also ordered to make restitution of $3448 for an estimated 6000 fish killed.2'
- Brian Odden, a farmer from Kingsbury County, S.D., has been accused of
damaging a slough that borders his farm. The U.S. Agricultural Department is
threatening to fine him as much as $500,000.?
- The Iowa Environmental Protection Commission has asked the Iowa Attorney
General's office to consider prosecuting A.J. "Jack" DeCoster, a Maine agribusiness
man, for allegedly polluting the Iowa river with hog manure. DeCoster owns no
hogs in Iowa, but built a number of large scale operations that he leases to other
hog producers. DeCoster is accused of letting manure run into the Iowa river after
the manure was applied to thirty-six acres of an eighty-acre field. DeCoster faces
fines of $5000 a day for each day the spill occurred.'
- Brant Child, a Utah property owner, had to abandon his plans to build a
campground and golf course near three lakes located on his 500 acres of desert land.
The Fish and Wildlife Service told him he couldn't use the property because of the
200,000 thumb-sized kanab amber snails which inhabit his lakes and are protected
under the Endangered Species Act. Child was also threatened with a $50,000 fine
for every snail eaten by the ten domestic geese abandoned on his lakes. After a
state wildlife official and highway patrolman were unsuccessful in getting the geese
20. Tom Charlier, EPA Fines Tennessee Farmer $49,500 in Wetlands Case, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 24, 1994, at B1.
21. Perry Beeman, Indianola Farmer Fined $15,000 for Pollution, DES MOINES REG., May 20,
1993, at 3.
22. Philip Brasher, Farmers Rebel Over Wetlands Regulations Environment: The Furor is Fueling
a Movement that Could Lead Congress to Gut Protective Laws in the Name of Property Rights, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at 9.
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to "vomit snails," the threat of fines was dropped. Child estimates, however, that
his inability to develop his property has cost him $2.5 million.'
• Larry Miner, president of San Jacinto California-based Agri-empire, Inc., was
arraigned on thirty-three federal counts, including conspiracy, mail fraud, and
illegally handling hazardous waste. Miner and his company allegedly bought partly
treated sewage water and used it on potato crops sold for human consumption. He
and his company were also accused of dumping and burying hazardous waste in
stored banned pesticides. The company faces up to $16.5 million in fines and Miner
faces 159 years in jail plus $8.25 million in fines.'
L Criminal Prosecutions
To those espousing "green values" virtually any violation of an environmental
statute is viewed as criminal, regardless of the violator's criminal intent and the fact
that some environmental crimes occur inadvertently as a side effect of normal
productive activities.' As then Attorney General Richard Thornburgh told the
National District Attorneys Association in 1989, "a polluter is a criminal who has
violated the rights and sanctity of a living thing-the largest living organism in the
known universe--the earth's environment."27
A. Federal Prosecutions
It is the belief of some EPA officials that 75% of individuals will comply with
the law only if violators are punished and the requirements are perceived as
mandatory. Criminal enforcement measures extend to that 75%."
Attorney General Janet Reno told attendees in a course on the criminal
enforcement of environmental law sponsored by the American Law Institute and
American Bar Association, "Those who violate the law will have a heavy price to
pay. 29
Given the comments of EPA and DOJ officials, one has to wonder if there is any
environmental violation that the government does not consider to be criminal.
Ronald Sarachan, head of the DOJ's Environmental Crimes Section, has stated
criminal charges may be filed in some "paper cases" of improper reporting." Lois
J. Schiffer, assistant attorney general for environment and natural resources, has said
24. A Snail Retreat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 6 (Review and Outlook column).
25. Alleged Sewage Use Puts Spud Company in a Stink, AGWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 9.
26. Rick Henderson, Crimes Against Nature: The New Vice Crusade Is Turning Justice Upside
Down, REASON, Dec. 1993, at 18.
27. Id.
28. Devaney, supra note 4, at 32 (paraphrasing the 1941 comments of Chester Bowles, a member
of the World War It-era Office of Price Administration, who said, "There will always be 5% of
individuals who will violate no matter what; 20% who will comply no matter what, and 75% who will
comply only if the violators are punished and the requirements are perceived as nonarbitrary.").
29. Reno Says DOJ Has 'Aggressive Program'to Protect Urban, Wilderness, Environments, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1269 (1994).
30. Id.
1995]
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that "paper violations are not victimless. Honest reporting is a direct and central
part of statutes to keep direct harm from the public."'"
An example of how seriously the government considers reporting violations can
be found in the recent case involving a seventy-three-year-old apple juice producer,
Benjamin Lacy, of Linden, Virginia?2 Lacy's environmental problems began after
a fire occurred at hi; plant. Following the resignation of his plant manager, Lacy
took over the task of getting the operation restarted. During this period of time,
officials from the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.(DEQ) demanded
his Discharge Monitoring Reports."
Lacy's Discharge Monitoring Reports pertained to the amount of waste apple juice
that ran off with rinse water. After reviewing thirty-four monthly reports, the DEQ
found incorrect figures on three of the reports and referred the case to the Virginia
Commonwealth attcrney. After the state's attorney refused the case, the U.S.
Department of Justice decided to pursue it and obtained an indictment. A former
Lacy employee was charged with two felony counts that were dismissed after he
agreed to testify against Lacy. A jury convicted Lacy, who now faces up to twenty-
four years in prison for the three incorrect reports.'
Between fiscal years 1983 and 1993, the DOJ obtained environmental criminal
indictments against 911 corporations and individuals and obtained 686 guilty pleas
and convictions. A total of $212,408,903 criminal fines were assessed and 388
years of imprisonment were imposed (with nearly 191 years of actual confine-
ment)."
In recent years the. EPA has "beefed up" its efforts to bring criminal cases against
polluters. At least 200 criminal investigators will soon be working on EPA criminal
cases. Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has allocated an increasing number
of staff hours to investigating EPA criminal cases' and has 500 pending cases.3
The DOJ recently shifted thirty-three attorneys to its Environmental Crimes Section
in response to the new demands.
The determination of federal prosecutors to go after corporate officials as well as
individuals on criminal charges in environmental cases is exemplified by a quote
from a Justice Department official who said: "It has been, and will continue to be,
Justice Department policy to conduct environmental criminal investigation with an
31. Id.
32. Paul Craig Roberts, Ax the Department of Injustice, ARK. DEmo.-GA_., Sept. 30, 1995, at 8B.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 870. The impact of EPA's more aggressive prosecutorial attitude is
evident in its impact on average criminal fines per individual and corporation. In 1992, for example,
individuals paid an average criminal fine of $240,000 while corporations paid an average of $502,000.
Devaney, supra note 4, at 32.
36. M. Brown, Government Inspection and Enforcement Actions, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH &
SAFETY MANAGER'S HANDBOOK, 83, 87 (1988).
37. Reno Says DOJ Has 'Aggressive Program' to Protect Urban, Wilderness Environments, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1269 (1994).
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eye toward identifying, prosecuting and convicting the highest ranking truly
responsible corporate officials.""8
Individuals convicted of environmental crime are .much more likely to go to jail
than in the past. The federal sentencing guidelines which took effect in 1987 leave
judges with very little discretion in deciding whether a defendant should serve jail
time.39 The guidelines create a point system for every federal crime. Jail time is
determined by comparing points corresponding to the defendant's crime and prior
criminal history.
The sentencing guidelines create four categories of environmental violations:
" Knowing endangerment of human life;
" Offenses involving hazardous or toxic substances;
" Offenses involving other pollutants;
" Conservation and wildlife.4
Each category has a base penalty level for knowingly violating the law. Penalties
increase if pollutants are released into the environment and for ongoing or
continuous violations. A prior history of criminal violations can also increase a
penalty. Reduced penalties are provided for acts of negligence and record keeping
and reporting violations'
Under the current basic scoring and grading level, most serious environmental
offenses would result in actual jail terms of two years or more.4 Even stricter
sentencing guidelines have recently been proposed for companies which violate
environmental laws.4"
Criminal fines have also been increased in excess of the limits set in the
applicable environmental statutes. Under the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of
1987' a defendant may be fined the maximum amount level established by:
" The law setting forth the offense;
• The amount specified in the Criminal Fine Improvements Act for the type of
offense; or
* The amount allowed under a new gain/loss formula.45
38. F. Henry Habricht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How
to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,480 (1987).
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 994-998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 781, 798 (1991) (citing Sentencing guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046-99
(1987), reprinted in U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2QI.1-2Q2.1 (1990)
[hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]).
41. Id. at 798; see also GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 40, at §§ 2Q1.l-.3.
42. Gerald Krovatin, Criminal Environmental Investigations: Caution Flags for Corporate
Managers, 12 CARDOzA L. REv. 1291, 1291-1292 (1991).
43. Jeffrey M. Rosin, New Chapter 9: An Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizational Environmental Offenders and the Historic Evolution of a Compliance Nightmare, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 559 (1994).
44. Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987).
45. Adler & Lord, supra note 40, at 799; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994).
1995]
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Fines can be increased based on the harm caused or gained by the violation.'
Fines for corporations are double those for individuals.47
1. Federal Environmental Statutes and Criminal Provisions
Federal environmental statutes are loaded with criminal penalties applicable to
corporations and individuals. Criminal penalties as set forth in key environmental
statutes have grown increasingly severe. As recently as 1990 a number of
environmental statutes were amended and increased the severity of criminal
penalties to be imposed on violators. The following is no more than a thumbnail
sketch of some of the criminal provisions found in federal environmental statutes
and laws applicable to agriculture. The information, however, is sufficient to stress
the seriousness of environmental criminal prosecutions.
a) Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA)' is potentially the most important piece of federal
legislation to impact agriculture. The CWA divides water pollution sources into the
categories of point sources and nonpoint sources.
(1) The NPDES Program
Point sources are regulated through the mandatory permit system known as the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).49 The NPDES ° is a
national permit system which controls discharges of pollutants from a point source
into waters of the UTnit d States. The NPDES program governs indirect discharges
through municipal sewage and treatment plants and industrial waste and sewage as
well as direct discharges, from both new and existing sources'
Most states administer the NPDES requirements upon approval of their state's
program. 2 Permits contain source specific effluent limitation and incorporate water
quality standards of the state. Although permits may be issued by the state, the EPA
may also review those permits and in some cases may disapprove the permit
issuance.
Point sources under the NPDES program are defined as "discernable, confined,
and discrete conveyances, including but not limited to . . .concentrated animal
feeding operations ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged.53 The term
does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994).
47. Id. § 3571(b)(c).
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1326 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. Id. § 1342.
50. Id. §§ 1251-1376.
51. Id. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52. Thirty-nine states administer the NPDES program. JOHN D. COPELAND & JANIE SIMMs Hipp,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAws IMPACTING OKLAHOMA LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS 2 n.6 (1994).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
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Discharges not requiring NPDES permits include discharges from "non-point
source agricultural and silvicultural activities including stormwater runoff from
orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, rangelands, and forest land, but not discharges
from concentrated animal feeding operations .... 
54. EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(e) (1994). Permits for discharges are also required for aquaculture projects and for
silvicultural point sources. Aquatic facilities are governed by requirements in 40 C.F.R. § 122.24 (1994),
and silviculturaI point sources by requirements in 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (1994).
Concentrated animal feeding operations are:
" a lot or facility where;
" animals are, will be, or have been stabled or confined and fed or maintained 45 days or more in any
12 month period;
- crops, vegetation forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing
season over any portion of the lot or facility, or
- determined on a case-by-case basis as being significant contributors to water pollution, considering
the following factors:
" size and amount of wastes
" location
" conveyance of wastes into waters
* slope, vegetation, rainfall, and
" other relevant factors.
Animal feeding operations are concentrated and an NPDES permit will be required if more than the
following numbers of animals in any one category are confined.
* 1000 slaughter and feeder cattle
* 700 mature dairy cattle
* 2500 swine (over 55 pounds)
* 500 horses
* 10,000 sheep or lambs
* 55,000 turkeys
* 100,000 laying hens or broilers (if the facility has continuous over flow watering)
* 30,000 laying hens or broilers (if the facility has a liquid manure system)
o 5,000 ducks, or
* 1000 animal units
If more than the following number and types are confined, the operation is considered concentrated
as well:
* 300 slaughter or feeder cattle
* 200 mature dairy cattle
* 750 swine (over 55 pounds)
* 150 horses
* 3,000 sheep or lambs
* 16,500 turkeys
* 30,000 laying hens or broilers (with overflow watering)
* 9,000 laying hens or broilers (with liquid manure system)
* 1500 ducks
* 300 animal units
In addition to meeting the foregoing animal quantity requirements, an operation must meet one of the
following criteria in order to be considered a concentrated animal feeing operation:
" pollutant discharge into navigable waters through a manmade ditch or flushing system, or
" pollutant discharge directly into waters passing through or coming into contact with the facility or
animals. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 & app. B (1994).
1995]
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(2) Southview Farm Decision and Point Sources
On September 2, 1994, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in a water pollution case which could significantly impact all livestock producers
and expose them to even more criminal prosecutions under the Clean Water Act
(CWA). In Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm,55
the Second Circuit found Southview Farm's dairy operation to be in violation of the
CWA. The dairy, located in rural Wyoming County in New York state, maintains
a dairy herd of approximately 1200 animals in a confinement area and operates on
a total of 2200 acres. Liquid manure from the animals is stored in lagoons and then
applied as fertilizer to approximately 1100 acres of land adjacent to the confinement
area by a center pivot irrigation system and conventional manure spreading
equipment.
The activity of gathering and confining animals and managing the attendant
manure operations by separation, storage, and eventual land application is a
common practice within the agricultural sector. Southview's dairy operation is not
unlike the operations of thousands of livestock producers. Traditionally, these
activities have not been designated point sources of pollution since the manure is
not conveyed to a navigable body of water by means of a man-made discrete
device, such as a pipe or ditch. As a result, the EPA has not required such
operations to obtain National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permits prior to the manure's application. According, however, to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, Sotthview Farm is a point source of pollution under the CWA
and, by implication, so are all other similar agricultural operations.'
Southview's legal problems began when area residents claimed that manure
leakage from Southview Farm's storage lagoon and runoff from Southview Farm's
crop operation pollutedi the Genesee river, a navigable body of water protected by
the CWA. Complaintis were made to the EPA and state environmental authorities,
both of whom declined to take any action against Southview Farm because of the
lack of evidence that Southview was a substantial source of pollution. Subsequently,
55. 34 F.3d 114, 115 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
56. Id. at 116.
57. Id. at 115. A fter the Second Circuit's ruling, Southview Farm filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Because of the potential impact of the Southview Farm
case on modem animal raising operations, the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC), American Farm
Bureau Federation, and the New York Farm Bureau, filed amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs in
support of Southview Farm, contending that Southview Farm was erroneously labeled a point source of
pollution subject to the CWA permit requirements.
In its amicus brief, NPPC addressed the potential economic impact of the Southview decision on the
pork industry, as well as the legal issues. Pork production in the United States has risen steadily over
the past 40 years with annual gross sales of over $11 billion. Approximately 236,000 pork producers
annually raise 17 billion paunds of pork. In the state of New York, which ranks 31st in the annual
marketing of hogs, 93 million head were commercially slaughtered in 1993. According to NPPC, the
application of the Southvin-v Farm decision to cases in other jurisdictions could have an adverse
economic impact on at leat 30,000 pork producers who each produce more than 1,000 head of swine
per year. Amicus curiae Brief of NPPC (NPPC Brief) at 1, Southview Farm v. Concerned Area Residents
for the Env't, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1316).
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a citizen's lawsuit was filed by the Concerned Area Residents for the Environment
(CARE) against Southview in a United States district court claiming that Southview
had violated the CWA by failing to obtain the required NPDES permits." A jury
ruled in favor of CARE. The U.S. district court judge, however, granted judgments
to the defendants as a matter of law, Southview Farm was not subject to the CWA's
permit requirements because it was not a point source of pollution. 9 CARE
appealed the district court ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals who
reversed the district court's decision.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed three critical questions: (1) is a dairy
farm that uses its animal manure to fertilize its feed crop fields a "concentrated
animal feeding operation (CAFO)" and thus a point source subject to the CWA's
permitting requirements; (2) are manure-spreading machines, or depressions (swales)
in a farm field, which do not directly discharge pollutants into navigable waters,
point sources subject to the CWA's permitting requirements; and (3) is liquid
manure washed off farm fields by a rainstorm considered "agricultural storm water
discharge" and therefore exempt from the CWA's definition of point source? On
each question, the Second Circuit answered in favor of CARE and against
Southview Farm.6
(a) CAFOs and AFOs
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) are subject to NPDES permit
requirements. An agricultural livestock operation is a CAFO only if it is first an
animal feeding operation (AFO) which requires a minimum number of animal units
as set forth in CWA regulations.62 In addition, to qualify as an AFO for Clean
Water Act purposes, the lot or facility on which the animals are raised must meet
the following conditions: (1) animals are or will be stabled or confined and fed or
maintained for a total of forty-five days or more in any twelve-month period and
(2) crops, vegetative forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the
normal growing season over any portion of the "lot or facility."'"
Southview Farm contended that its dairy was not an animal feeding operation for
CWA purposes because it grew substantial crops and forage on the land adjacent
to the animal confinement area. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
refused to find that Southview's "lot or facility" included the entire 2200 acres of
land encompassing both the animal confinement area and adjacent crop land.' In
holding Southview Farm to be a CAFO, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated
58. 834 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
59. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1418
(,.D.N.Y. 1993) (CARE I); Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp.
1422, 1423 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (CARE II).
60. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
61. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 115.
62. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b) (1994).
63. Id. § 122.23(b)(1)(i), (ii).
64. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
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that a confined animal feeding operation is synonymous with "feedlot."' As
defined in the CWA regulations, a feedlot is a concentrated, confined animal
growing operation for meat, milk, egg production, or stabling, in pens or houses
wherein the animals or poultry are fed at the place of confinement and crop or
forage growth or production is not sustained in the area of confinement.'
An animal feeding operation, however, is defined differently in the CWA.
Although some animal feeding operations may be feedlots, not all such operations
are feedlots. The key difference in the definition of a feedlot and an animal feeding
operation is that an animal feeding operation for CWA purposes does not include
an operation which sustains crops, vegetation, or post-harvest residues over any
portion of the lot orfacility. Only feedlots require crops to be grown in the specific
area of confinement tD avoid being classified as CAFOs'
Southview Farm and its supporters argued that the EPA clearly intended animal
feeding operations to be subject to a broader definition than feedlots. Instead of
limiting the vegetative forage growth or crops to the area of animal confinement,
as in feedlot situations, the EPA used the terms "lot or facility." The National Pork
Producers Council's (N'PPC) amicus curiae brief pointed out that, although the term
"lot or facility" is not defined in the Clean Water Act, it is defined in several places
in the Clean Air Act (CAA).' The CAA makes it clear that a lot or facility
includes all buildings, structures, and operations on one contiguous site, as well as
adjacent properties under the control of the same person or persons.' If the
Second Circuit had adopted the CAA's definition of "lot or facility," it would have
had no choice but to uphold the district court's finding that Southview Farm is not
an animal feeding opration subject to CWA permit requirements because it grew
crops on the land adjacent to the animal confinement area and the entire operation
was under Southview's control7
(b) Manure Equipment as Point Source
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also held Southview Farm's manure
spreading equipment to be a point source?' NPPC argued in its brief that holding
land application vehicles to be point sources ignores the distinction between
nonpoint and point sources.' A nonpoint source conveys material in a diffuse
manner as opposed to a point source's discrete man-made conveyance. Land
application of animal manure is a traditional nonpoint source and to hold land
application vehicles to be point sources creates no viable alternative for getting
liquid manure onto fields. NPPC contended that, if this type of land application is
a point source, it would be virtually impossible to use land application as a method
65. Id.
66. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 123.
67. NPPC Brief at 8, Southview Farm (No. 94-1316).
68. Id. at 9.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
70. NPPC Brief at 9, 10, Southview Farm (No. 94-1316).
71. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119.
72. NPPC Brief at 16, Southview Farm (No. 94-1316).
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for disposing of manure.' However, almost all states encourage the use of land
application by animal feeding operations in order to cut down on liquid waste
disposal problems. The land application of manure is an effective and inexpensive
means of waste disposal, and is also a less chemically-dependent method of
fertilization. In fact, the EPA's Region VI general permit authorizes the use of land
application of waste generated by CAFOs when done so in accordance with
recognized practices of good agricultural management. To hold that a roving piece
of equipment used in the application of waste to the land is a point source raises the
question as to whether other moving vehicles used in agricultural operations can
also be considered point sources.'
(c) Swale as Point Source
Besides designating manure spreading vehicles as point sources, the Second
Circuit also found a depression in the ground (swale) on the property to be a point
source." The Second Circuit, in declaring the swale to be a point source, found
that manure collected in the swale flowed into a pipe under a stone wall, ran into
a ditch, then into a stream, and eventually into the Genesee river.76 NPPC argued
that the collection of manure in a swale and the subsequent meandering of the
manure after a rainfall fits the nonpoint source definition of waste spread in a
diffuse manner and that a swale is not a man-made discrete conveyance contemplat-
ed by the statutory definition of a point source.'
(d) Storm Water Discharges
Beginning in 1987, Congress specifically exempted all agricultural storm water
discharges from the CWA's permitting requirements.78 As a matter of law, storm
water discharges cannot be point sources. Southview Farm contended that manure
from its fields migrated off the property only after heavy rainstorms. While the
district court held that the manure runoff from Southview Farm's cultivated crops
was an agricultural storm water discharge exempt from CWA permitting require-
ments, the Second Circuit found otherwise. It ruled that there are two classes of
storm water discharges, those which are exempt from CWA provisions and those
that are not. The court held that if "sufficient" quantities of manure are present in
the agricultural runoff, the runoff cannot be classified as "storm water." The court,
however, did not identify what constitutes a "sufficient quantity."'
73. Id. at 16-17.
74. NPPC Brief at 16-18, Southview Farm (No. 94-1316).
75. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 118.
76. Id. at 118-19.
77. NPPC Brief at 16-18, Southview Farm (No. 94-1316).
78. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503, 101 Stat. 7, 75 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §
13 4 2 (p) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
79. Southview Farm, 34 F.2d at 121.
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(3) Nonpoint Source Pollutants
Animal production systems not subject to NPDES point source requirements are
governed under the CWA provisions for nonpoint source pollution. Agriculture, in
general, has been named in a number of studies as the single largest contributor to
nonpoint source pollution. Agriculture, including crop and animal production, has
been identified as the leading source of nonpoint source pollution affecting rivers,
lakes and wetlands.' In response to the concern over nonpoint source agricultural
pollution Congress has enacted several additional provisions to the CWA to address
the problem. The following is a brief summary of those provisions:
Section 20881 requires each state to develop management plans to address
significant water problems. The management plans must assess both point source
and nonpoint source problems. Return flows from irrigated agricultural land, runoff
from manure disposal and runoff from land used for livestock must be covered in
the management plans. Section 208 also requires states to specify feasible measures
for controlling nonpoint source agricultural pollution and establishes the Rural Clean
Water Program.
Section 305(b)" requires a state to assess its water quality and to report its
findings to the EPA every two years. Reports must describe the nature and extent
of nonpoint sources of pollutants with recommendations to state programs to control
the problem.
Section 319' added the following new policy statement to the CWA's goals and
policy provisions: "[I]t is the national policy that programs for the control of non-
point sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner
so as to enable the goals of this Act to be met through the control of both point and
non-point sources of pollution."'
Although section 319 does not require the states to implement mandatory
regulatory controls, states must identify those waters that cannot attain or maintain
state water quality standards without additional controls on nonpoint sources of
pollution.'
(4) Section 404 Clean Water Act - Wetlands Protection
The Clean Water Act! (CWA) has as its goal restoring and maintaining of the
integrity of the nation's waters. Along with regulation of discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters of the country, otherwise known as "point source" regulation,
80. USEPA, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 2 (1992); see also George A. Gould,
Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Federal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 461 (1990).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 12E;8(b)(F) (1988).
82. Id. § 1315(b).
83. Id. § 1329.
84. Id. § 1251(a)(7).
85. Id. § 1329.
86. Id. §§ 1251-1376.
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CWA regulates what is known as "dredge and fill" activity. Section 404 of CWA
provides protection to what are known as "wetlands" from dredge and fill activity.'
When determining whether section 404 applies, five questions must be answered:
1. Is the area a wetland;
2. Is the activity a dredge and fill activity;
3. Is there a general permit available which will allow the activity;
4. Is an individual permit required; and
5. Are there exceptions for the type of activity involved?' s
(a) Wetlands
Wetlands are lands that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and under normal circumstances does
support vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas."
There has been considerable regulatory indecision regarding the definition of a
wetland. This indecision stems, in part, from the shared jurisdictional authority for
determining whether wetlands exist and enforcing wetlands preservation require-
ments. The United States Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) share jurisdiction over wetlands. Permits to conduct
dredge and fill activities are obtained from the Corps, while the EPA sets standards
for the permitting process and has veto power over permits granted by the Corps.
Both the EPA and the Corps have enforcement roles, both to require compliance
with a permit or to enforce the requirement that a permit be obtained.
There have been several interpretations offered by both the Corps and the EPA
regarding hydrology criteria, acceptable indicators of hydrology criteria, depth of
soil saturation required, and the definition of growing season, all components of the
wetlands definition. These interpretations were set forth in EPA and Corps
documents: a 1987 manual, a 1989 manual, and a 1991 revision to the 1989
manual.' The issue of which standards to use to define a wetland is still unre-
solved. At present, however, there are basically three criteria for determining if a
wetland exists: (1) presence of water; (2) presence of soil type, specifically hydric
soil type; and (3) presence of vegetation supported by hydric soil inundated or
saturated with water. Prior converted croplands are not considered wetlands.9'
87. Id. § 1344.
88. COPELAND & Hipp, supra note 52, at 8.
89. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1995) (EPA Regulations defining wetlands); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1995)
(Corps of Engineers regulations defining wetlands).
90. EPA, WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL: 1987 EDMON (1987); EPA, WETLANDS
IDENTIFICATION: FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS
(1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (1991).
91. CORPS OF ENGINEERS REGULATORY GUIDANcE L=rrER 90.7 (June 16, 1992) (proposing an
amendment to Corps regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,894 (1992)).
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(b) Waters of the United States
Section 404 regulates discharge of dredge or fill material into "Waters of the
United States." "Waters of the United States" includes:
" traditional navigable waters including adjacent wetlands;'
" tributaries to navigable waters, including adjacent wetlands (excluding manmade
drainage and irrigation ditches);
• interstate waters and other tributaries, including adjacent wetlands; and
* other waters of the United States, such as isolated wetlands and lakes,
intermittent streams and prairie potholes!'
(c) Discharge, Dredge and Fill
In order for section 404 to apply, there must be some discharge into the waters
of the United States. In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh,' the court
held that removing vegetation from a wetland and then burying the material back
into the wetland corstituted a discharge. The court did not rule on whether mere
removal of vegetation without redepositing required compliance with permit
requirements. Later proposed regulations reflect that if the overall project is to
destroy or degrade the area, and by the nature of the project there will be some
redepositing, a permit is required.95 According to the Corps, any activity involving
land clearing, ditching, channelizing, and excavating is a regulated activity, but that
pumping water from a wetland is not a regulated activity."
(d) Permits
If the area is a wetland and the activity is dredge and fill in nature, a permit may
be required.' Perrdts must be obtained prior to engaging in dredge and fill
activity. Before the permit is issued, the Corps will decide whether the proposed
activity will adversely affect the waters of the United States or whether the impact
will be minimal. Permits granted by the Corps may be vetoed by the EPA.
(e) Types of Permits
There are two types of permits: general and individual. General permits are
usually statewide, regional, or national in scope and involve minor impacts of
92. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
93. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1995) (stating Corps definition of waters of the United States).
94. 715 F.2d 897, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1983).
95. 57 Fed. Reg. 26,894 (1992). EPA proposed regulations were inconsistent with the Corps
regulations. EPA took th, position that excavation with redepositing on upland sites was not a regulated
activity.
96. A Texas court held that pumping water from a wetland is a regulated activity since it has the
effect of converting the wetland. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1990),
rev'd, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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wetland resources.98 General permits are put in place using the federal rulemaking
procedures.
Individual permits may be granted for those activities for which there is no
general permit and there are no practicable alternatives.' For non-water dependent
projects, the assumption is made that there will be a practicable alternative, and if
there is not, the permit will contain mitigating requirements or site change
requirements. Mitigation may be on-site or off-site, such as through the donation
of land to conservation.
If a state or local law is more protective of wetlands, a permit which might
otherwise be granted by the Corps could be denied due to lack of permission for the
permit from the state authority."
09 Exceptions
There are statutory exceptions to the permit requirements of section 404."la
These exceptions are for normal farming, ranching, or logging activities, if those
activities are already occurring and will be ongoing and continuous in nature. If
there is an alteration in operations, permits are required."~
Finally, if property is a wetland and a permit is denied, a "taking" for which
compensation must be made to the landowner has occurred if the land is left with
no economically beneficial or productive use. Generally, value determinations will
be made based on the wetland specific area for which the permit is denied."°
Section 1319 of the Clean Water Act provides criminal penalties for both
"negligent" and "willful" violations of effluent limitations or permit conditions.
Negligent violations may be punished by fines between $2500 and $25,000 per day
and/or incarcerations up to one year for a first offense. Subsequent offenses subject
the perpetrator to fines up to $50,000 per day and jail terms up to two years."°
Knowing violations may be punished by fines up to $250,000 and/or imprison-
ment up to fifteen years. Subsequent violations may be punished by fines up to
double for a single violation. 5
b) Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (CAA)'" is now one of the most comprehensive and
complex pieces of U.S. environmental legislation. What was a fifty-page document
in 1970 now runs more than 750 pages. On November 15, 1990, President Bush





102. United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986).
103. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
105. Id. § 1319(c)(3).-
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
107. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V
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The 1990 amendments require sources subject to pollution controls to obtain
operating permits, which must include a comprehensive statement of the source's
Clean Air Act obligations as to emission limits, fee requirements, inspection,
monitoring and reporting duties." Violators are exposed to administrative
compliance orders and federal court injunctions.
Under the 1990 amendments, all criminal penalties are now felonies. Fines of up
to $250,000 per day may be imposed on individuals and up to $500,000 for
corporations. Prison terms of up to five years may be imposed. Subsequent
violations may result in the doubling of sanctions."
Knowing endangerment offenses for the release of hazardous air pollutants may
subject individuals to fines of up to $250,000 and to jail sentences of up to fifteen
years. Corporations may be fined up to $1,000,000."' Negligently releasing
hazardous air pollutants can subject the polluter to fines up to $250,000 and/or one
year in jail if the polluter knows that his actions will place another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury."' Making false statements on
reports or tampering with monitoring devices may result in fines up to $250,000 per
day and/or jail terms up to two years."'
In April 1994, the EPA announced its reward program for citizens who report
companies that violate the Clean Air Act. Rewards up to $10,000 are awarded to




The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act"'
(CERCLA) was passed to rectify perceived inadequacies of earlier environmental
legislation, especially the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA)."5 RCRA was deemed inadequate to address past hazardous waste
disposal sites."6
CERCLA creates three types of liability. Section 104 authorizes the federal
government to conduct cleanup operations with funds from the "Superfund. '"" The
government may then seek under section 107 to recover the costs from "potentially
responsible parties" (PRPs)."' The government is also authorized under section
1993)).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
109. Id. § 7413(c)(1).
110. Id. § 7413(c)(5).
111. Id. § 7413(c)(4).
112. Id. § 7413(c)(2).
113. Citizens Cou!d Gain Reward for Reporting Clean Air Violations, Under EPA Proposal, 25
Env't Rep. (BNA) 12 (May 6, 1994).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988).
116. Linda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate
Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 259, 264 (1992).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
118. Id. § 9607.
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106 to issue cleanup directives or seek injunctive relief ordering PRPs to conduct
responsive actions to abate an "immediate and substantial endangerment to public
health or the environment."'1 9 Also, private parties are authorized under section
111 to seek reimbursement from the "Superfund" or they may file cost recovery
actions against PRPs under section 107."~
CERCLA and the courts have broadly defined the term "persons" as used in the
act. "Person" includes individuals, corporations and other corporate actors, such as
officials, as well as other types of business entities."'
Under CERCLA criminal penalties may be levied for failing to report releases,
knowingly reporting false or misleading information or knowingly destroying or
falsifying records." Fines may go up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for
corporations, or may be based upon the pecuniary gain or loss. Jail terms of up to
three years for a first conviction and up to five years for subsequent convictions are
also available."
CERCLA also has an interesting "snitch" feature to it. An individual who
provides information leading to the arrest and conviction of a person failing to
report a release can receive up to $10,000."
d) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act criminalizes a variety of knowing
violations as to the transportation of waste to unpermitted facilities, and/or
transporting, treating, storing, or disposing of waste without a permit."z Also,
making false statements or knowingly omitting material information in applications,
manifests, reports, etc., constitutes criminal conduct." Fines can go as high as
$50,000 per day of violation and imprisonment may be from two to five years
depending on the violation. Subsequent convictions result in a doubling of
penalties." 7
Any person who knowingly violates the law and subjects another person to
imminent danger of death or serious injury may be fined up to $250,000 and/or
imprisoned up to fifteen years. A corporation found guilty of knowing endanger-
ment is subject to a fine up to $1,000,000."
119. Id. § 9606.
120. LAWRENCE P. SCHNAPF, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LAW & STRATEGY FOR BUsINESSES AND
CORPORATIONS §§ 5.09, 5.10-.11 (1992).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
122. Id, § 9603(b).
123. Id.
124. d § 9609(d).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6986 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
126. Id. § 6928.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
128. Id. § 6928.
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
e) Endangered Species Act (ESA)
The Endangered Species Act' also prohibits private persons from taking any
endangered or threatened species of animal listed under the Act without a permit or
exemption. "Taking" is defined as harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting,
wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting the animal.'" An intent to take
the animal is a required element of a violation of the Act. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service has taken action against farmers and ranchers who kill protected
animals with meat illegally laced with pesticides.' Note also that in Christy v.
Hodel, the court upheld the authority under the Act of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to assess penalties against livestock owners who deliberately kill
grizzly bears, an endangered species, in order to protect their livestock. Livestock
owners had challenged the Act on various federal constitutional grounds.
Section 1538 of the Endangered Species Act sets out acts prohibited under the
ESA. The ESA makes it unlawful for anyone to import, take, possess, sell, deliver,
or transport an endangered species of fish or wildlifeP' or an endangered species
of plant." Any person who knowingly violates such prohibited conduct is liable
for a criminal fine up to $50,000 and/or one year of imprisonment. 3 All other
ESA violations, such as reporting violations, are subject to a criminal fine up to
$25,000 and/or six. months imprisonment."6
J9 Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 37 implements conventions between the United
States and Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the USSR for the protection of migratory
birds. Note that birds protected under the Act are not necessarily endangered. The
Act provides that except as permitted by regulation, it is unlawful at any time, by
any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, or kill any migratory
bird.' Violation of the Act is a misdemeanor with penalties of fines up to $500
and imprisonment up to six months.'39 Federal courts have split on the question
of requisite intent to impose liability under the Act in cases where birds are
poisoned by pesticides."4
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
130. Id. §§ 1532(8), (19), 1538(a).
131. Three Men Sentenced for Illegal Pesticide Use on Wildlife in Wyoming, U.S. Newswire, Jan.
13, 1994, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 7128431.
132. 857 F.2d 1324, 1336 (9th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
133. 16 U.S.C. - 1538(a)(I)(A)-(G) (1994).
134. Id. § 1538(a)(2).
135. Id. § 1540.
136. Id.
137. Id. §§ 703-711.
138. Id. § 703.
139. Id. § 707(a).
140. See United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the Act is a
strict liability statute and approved its application to a defendant who used pesticides to poison birds,
even though the defendant did not know that his use of the pesticide would kill protected migratory
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g) Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),4 the major federal statute
governing pesticide use. FIFRA establishes minimum national standards for the use
of pesticides. The Act also regulates the registration, production, and sale of
pesticides.
FIFRA grants primary, but not exclusive, enforcement responsibility for pesticide
use to the states."" States retain the authority to regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the state under state law, but only if and
to the extent that regulations do not permit any sale or use prohibited under
FIFRA."1 In addition, states may not impose or continue in effect any require-
ments for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under
FIFRA.
14 4
(1) Use of Pesticides
FIFRA provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to use any registered
pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling.
45
Based on toxicity or degree of adverse effects on humans and the environment,
the EPA divides pesticides into two broad groups, either unclassified (general use)
or restricted use pesticides."
Pesticides for unclassified or general use may be purchased and used by any
person in a manner consistent with the pesticide's label. Restricted use pesticides
may be applied only by or under the direct supervision of a certified applicator.
Note that "under the direct supervision of a certified applicator" means that the
pesticide is applied by a competent person acting under the instructions and control
of a certified applicator who is available if and when needed, even though such
certified applicator is not physically present at the time and place the pesticide is
applied, unless the pesticide label prescribes a greater degree of supervision.'47
birds); United States v. FMC, Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1978) (resolving the scienter issue
by noting that a "technical" violation of the Act could be punished by a small or nominal fine); United
States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Idaho 1989) (ruling that the Act was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to a defendant farmer whose application of pesticide resulted in the death of a flock of
geese when the defendant used due care in applying the pesticide); United States v. Corbin Farm Servs.,
444 F. Supp. 510, 535-36 (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd 518 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (ruling that the Act can
be constitutionally applied to persons whose use of pesticides is not intended to kill migratory birds but
results in bird kills).
141. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
142. Id. §§ 136w-I, 136w-2.
143. id. § 136v(a).
144. Id. § 136v(b).
145. Id. 99 136(ee), 136j(a)(2)(G).
146. Id. § 136a(d). Pesticides classified under FIFRA for restricted use are listed at 40 C.F.R. §
152.175 (1995).
147. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(4) (1994).
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FIFRA requires the certification of applicators of restricted use pesticides and
provides for EPA-approved state certification programs.'
(2) Reporting Reqaireinents
Under FIFRA regulations,149 commercial applicators must keep and maintain,
for a period of at least two years, routine operational records containing information
on kinds, amounts, uses, dates, and places of application of restricted use pesticides.
The 1990 Farm Bill added the following recordkeeping and disclosure require-
ments for pesticide use:
* certified pesticide applicators must maintain restricted use pesticide application
records comparable to those of commercial applicators under state law;
* within thirty (30) days of restricted use pesticide application, a certified
commercial applicator shall provide a copy of records of the pesticide application
to the person for whom the application was provided;
- the records must be made available to any federal or state agency that deals
with pesticide use or any health or environmental issue related to the use of
pesticides on the request of the agency. A government agency may not release data
from the records that directly or indirectly reveals the identity of individual
producers. The USDA is charged with administering access to the records by
federal agencies. States shall designate a lead agency to administer access by state
agencies;
- when a health professional determines that pesticide information maintained in
the records is necessary to provide medical treatment or first aid to an individual
who may have been exposed to pesticides, upon request, persons required to
maintain the records shall promptly provide the record and available label
information to the health professional. In the case of an emergency, the information
shall be provided immediately;
. penalties in the form of fines imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture are
included; and
- the amendment requires that the USDA and the EPA use the records to develop
and maintain a data base sufficient to enable the USDA Secretary and the EPA
Administrator to publish annual comprehensive reports concerning agricultural and
nonagricultural pesticide use."'
(3) Disposal of Pesticide Containers
A pesticide's labeling may contain specified procedures for disposal of the
pesticide and the pesticide's container. Disposal of such pesticide in a manner
inconsistent with the labeling violates FIFRA."' Note also that the EPA has
148. Id. § 136i; 40 C.F.R. § 171 (1995).
149. 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(b)(1)(iii)(E) (1995).
150. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1491, 104
Stat. 3359, 3627-28 (199)) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1 (1994)).
151. 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
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promulgated regulations for the EPA's disposal of specified pesticides which can no
longer be legally used because their registration has been canceled." The agency
has also promulgated recommended procedures for the disposal of unwanted
pesticides."
(4) Worker Protection Standard
Agricultural employers must also comply with the Worker Protection Standard
for Agricultural Pesticides (WPS) which became effective April 15, 1994.'" The
WPS covers all agricultural employers and their employees. The WPS contains
requirements for training employees who handle pesticides, provisions from
protecting employees from pesticide exposure, and the providing of emergency
assistance to exposed employees. The WPS follows the civil and criminal penalties
as set out in FIFRA."55
2. Other Federal Criminal Provisions: Non-Environmental Laws
In addition to the criminal penalties set forth in specific federal environmental
statutes, there are other federal criminal laws which are often applicable in such
cases. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a person who knowingly and willfully
makes false statements to the federal government is subject to a fine of up to
$10,000 and/or imprisonment up to five years."
Mail fraud charges may be brought under sections 1341 and 1343 of 18 U.S.C.
if the mails, airwaves, or interstate wires are used in connection with a "scheme or
artifice" to defraud, or obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent
representation." In United States v. Gold,' mail fraud indictments were ob-
tained against a chemical corporation and its officers for false statements made to
the EPA.
Conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371 may also be brought if two or more
corporate officials conspire to violate criminal laws.5 9
B. State Prosecutions
Many states have enacted state environmental statutes that closely parallel federal
legislation. Forty states, for example, have enacted laws similar to CERCLA.'"
These "mini-superfunds" vary considerably from state to state, but they hold in
common severe criminal sanctions. The same can be said for other state environ-
mental statutes.
152. 40 C.F.R. § 165 (1994).
153. Id.
154. 40 C.F.R. § 170 (1995).
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
157. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
158. 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); see United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
160. L.P. SCHNAPF, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR BusINEssEs AND
CORPORATIONS § 6.07, at 6-15 (1992).
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1. In General
Not to be outdone by federal prosecutors, state prosecutors also now demonstrate
a greater willingness to bring criminal actions against individuals, corporations, and
corporate officers in environmental cases. As one prosecutor states: "We want the
company's money and the owner's liberty .... 6
In some cases, federal law specifically delegates enforcement responsibility for
an environmental statute to the states. For example, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) delegates enforcement responsibility to the
states. However, FIFRA violators may be prosecuted under both state and
federal law regardles3 of the delegation." In United States v. Orkin Exterminating
Co.,' Orkin was prosecuted in federal court under a five-count criminal indict-
ment for the pesticide poisoning of an elderly Virginia couple. The defense moved
to dismiss the federal indictments on the basis that the state of Virginia had
enforcement responsibility under FIFRA.'" The court held, however, that the
delegation of primary enforcement authority does not mean that a state is given
"exclusive enforcement authority."'" The court thus refused to dismiss the federal
indictments and permitted the United States Attorney General's Office to proceed
with the prosecution.'67
In recent years, state enforcement authorities have vigorously prosecuted
environmental crimes. Many of the environmental prosecutions now take place at
the state level, as state environmental statutes have criminal provisions similar to
those found in federal statutes.'"
Also, some states have passed far reaching environmental legislation containing
severe criminal penalties. The California Corporate Criminal Liability Act of 1989,
which became effective January 1991," places extensive reporting requirements
on corporations and backs those up with criminal penalties. Corporations, including
officers and managers, are required to report serious concealed dangers of which
they have actual knowledge.7 ' Reports are made to CALOSHA. Failure to report
such dangers makes officers and managers subject to fines up to $25,000 and/or
imprisonment up to three years. Corporations may be fined up to $1,000,000.",
161. JOHN D. COPELAND, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IMPACTING LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS AND OTHER
AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS 43 (1993).
162. 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1 (1994).
163. Id.
164. 688 F. Supp. 223 (W.D. Va. 1988).
165. Id. at 224.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 224-25.
168. Daniel Riesel, Cjrporate and Individual Criminal Liability Arisingfrom Environmental Crimes,
in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: SUPERFUND, AND.TOXIC SUBSTANCES (1988), available in Westlaw,
C352 ALI-ABA 281.
169. See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1995).
170. Id.
171. See MARSHA S. CRONINGER & ERIC P. BEREZIN, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING AND THE FIFrm
AMENDMENT UNDER CALIFORNIA'S NEW CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY ACT 113 (PLI Litigation &
Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series No. 409, 1991), available at Westlaw, 409 PLI/LIT 113.
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In New Jersey, a conviction for a second-degree offense under the environmental
laws creates a presumption of incarceration.'" The only way to defeat the
presumption is by the defendant proving his imprisonment would be a serious
injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." Pennsylvania
has adopted an absolute liability standard for criminal misdemeanor violations of its
Solid Waste Management Act.'74
2. Common Law Prosecutions Under State Law
Although for years states treated air and water pollution as regulatory offenses
instead of common law crimes, there is plenty of precedent for invoking state
criminal law as to polluters. Examples of common law theories for the prosecution
of environmental crime include assault, battery, and homicide, as well as traditional
statutory offenses such as conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation."5 States have often
invoked their traditional police powers to prosecute polluters for the infliction of
toxic harms on individuals and the environment.7 ' State common law prosecutions
for environmental crimes are not preempted by federal law. The supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution provides for federal preemption. Article VI
provides in pertinent part that "[tihis constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . .. .'" Thus, as to some matters, the federal regulation of an activity is so
pervasive as to totally preempt state law. For example, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the uniform federal standards for the
design and construction of tanker vessels preempted more stringent state design
requirements. Besides arising from the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme, preemption may arise from explicit statutory language, by inference from
Congressional intent to supersede state law, or from the situation where compliance
with both state and federal law is physically impossible.'
Given the extensive federal environmental statutes that have arisen since 1970,
it has frequently been argued that the environmental field is preempted by federal
172. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:44-1(d) (1995).
173. Id.
174. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6018.606(i) (1993) (Health and Safety).
175. Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a
Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311, 325 (1990).
176. Id. at 331 n.l 14 (citing People v. Union Oil Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 78, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(allowing prosecution under Fish and Game Act for petroleum deposited into state waters); Common-
wealth v. Sonnebom, 66 A.2d 584, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949) (permitting prosecution under statute
prohibiting discharge of industrial waste into public waters); Humphreys, supra note 175, at 331 n.116
(citing State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203, 206 (N.H. 1836) (holding the pollution of well by throwing dead
animal carcass into it was indictable at common law); id. at 331 n.117 (citing Attorney Gen. v. Wobum,
79 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1948) (upholding statute prohibiting discharge into public waters of matter likely
to create a public nuisance)); see also Commonwealth v. Straight Creek Coal & Coke Co., 145 S.W. 738
(Ky. Ct. App. 1912) (upholding indictment under water pollution statute).
177. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
178. 435 U.S. 151, 166 (1978).
179. Humphreys, supra note 175, at 338-39, nn.167-71.
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law, leaving little or no room for state regulations, including prosecution under state
criminal common law. However, in three state court cases, state prosecutors
prevailed when faced with preemption defenses. All three cases involved workers
exposed to toxic substances:
- New York v. Fymrn Thermometer." The New York Supreme Court upheld a
guilty verdict against a company and its officials that operated an illegal mercury
reclamation operation. The defendants were found guilty of conspiring to falsify
business records to hide the existence of working conditions which recklessly
endangered the lives of workers. The court held that state prosecution was not
preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). " '
- Illinois v. O'Neill." Three executives of Film Recovery Systems, Inc. were
found guilty of the murder of an employee who died from acute cyanide toxicity.
Cyanide was used to extract silver from used film. It was held that the defendants
were knowledgeable of the dangers associated with the use of cyanide and had
failed to impart that knowledge to the employee. Although the case was later
reversed on other grounds, it was held that the state prosecution was not preempted
by OSHA."
- People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp." A wire manufacturer and five
corporate officials were indicted on multiple counts of aggravated battery, reckless
conduct, and violation of the Illinois conspiracy statute. The trial court and an
Appellate Court of Illinois both held that the comprehensiveness of OSHA
preempted state criminal statutes as to the workplace conditions and worker safety.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions on preemption and
the United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision.
II. The Controversy Surrounding Criminal Prosecutions
As criminal prosecutions for environmental violations have rapidly increased, so
has the criticism of the appropriateness of such prosecutions. The criticism towards
federal prosecutions has been especially intense because of some high profile and
highly controversial prosecutions, some of which are described in this article.
Although all federal departments responsible for enforcing environmental laws have
been criticized, the Department of Interior, the EPA and the DOJ have borne the
brunt of the criticism.
There is no question that some violators of environmental laws need to be
prosecuted as criminals. A Wyoming sheep rancher recently received a fifteen-
month prison sentence and a $16,175 fine for capturing and mutilating fourteen bald
180. 591 N.Y.S.2d 459, 459 (1992).
181. Id.
182. 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 206 (Ill. App. Ct. July 7, 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 14 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1377 (Jan. 31, 1990) (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 1990).
183. Id.
184. 510 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd 534 N.E.2d 962 (I11. 1989), cert. denied sub noml.,
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or golden eagles."~ The only controversy in such a case is why was he not
punished more severely. Similarly, another Wyoming rancher was sentenced to two
years of supervised probation and fines totalling $22,000 for violations of the
Endangered Species Act and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
after the poisoning of one bald eagle and the shooting of a golden eagle on his
ranch."
The EPA and DOJ also deserve praise for their recent attempts to prosecute
Noble Cunningham and his R&D Chemical Co. On April 1, 1995, Cunningham was
featured on "America's Most Wanted." Cunningham and his family members
allegedly shipped 400 tons of hazardous waste from their farm in Mansfield, Ohio,
to Atlanta where it was illegally dumped. R&D Chemical Co. has been successfully
prosecuted and Cunningham is still being pursued."
Many more examples of appropriate criminal prosecutions could be listed. Still,
serious questions have been raised about a number of federal environmental crimes
prosecutions, and, as a result, the government and those who support environmental
criminal prosecutions have been placed on the defensive.
A. Arguments in Favor of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions
Supporters of criminal prosecutions contend that environmental laws are public
welfare statutes. 9 Because these laws protect the general health, safety, and
welfare of the public, criminal prosecutions are absolutely necessary in that:
- environmental laws seek to prevent harms that can be just as significant as those
associated with more traditional criminal acts; 9
- the moral culpability of violators of environmental laws is just as great as those
who commit traditional crimes such as murder, robbery, or assault, and that




186. Gary Gerhardt, Wyoming Rancher Convicted of Killing Eagles, 15-Month, $16,175 Sentence
Is First Under Protection Act, ROCKY MTN. NEws, May 19, 1995, at 10A.
187. Three Men Sentenced for Illegal Pesticide Use on Wildlife in Wyoming, supra note 131.
188. Carey Gillam, No More Slaps on the Wrist: The U.S. Attorney, the FBI, the EPA and State
Officials are Working Together to Crack Down on Local Environmental Crimes, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 14, 1995, at IB.
189. Public Welfare statutes have been described by the United States Supreme Court as a
congressional response to the Industrial Revolution:
"Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who
dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable standards of quality,
integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or
activities that affect public health, safety or welfare. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254
(1952).
190. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 879-80.
191. Id.
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0 unless criminal sanctions are severely applied to both individuals and
corporations, environmental sanctions will simply be viewed as another cost of
doing business."
The EPA has been particularly defensive about its selection of cases for criminal
prosecution. The EPA contends that it carefully evaluates and screens cases so that
criminal charges are filed only against those most deserving of criminal prosecution.
In evaluating whom to prosecute the agency looks at a number of factors including,
but not limited to: a history of noncompliance or repeated violations; knowing and
willful behavior; the concealment or falsification of violations; potential deterrent
effect; and the impact of the violation's harm on human health or the depletion of
natural resources.' "
The screening process includes a review by the agent in charge before opening
a case, approval by the appropriate EPA regional counsel, early approval by an
assistant U.S. attorney or the Department of Justice, and a final formal DOJ review
before indictment."' The EPA contends that its evaluation and screening process
creates a checks and balances system which equals or surpasses other systems in
place within federal law enforcement. According to the EPA, its system assures that
criminal sanctions are reserved for those cases most deserving of criminal
enforcement.'95
B. Arguments Against the Use of Criminal Laws
Critics of federal criminal prosecutions agree that only the most serious
environmental cases should be handled as criminal prosecutions and they point to
legislative history in support of their position. They question, however, whether the
EPA and DOJ are following Congressional intent. Testimony from Senate hearings
on the Pollution Prosecution Act indicate that criminal prosecutions are to be
undertaken only as to the most egregious offenders. For example, Robert Adler,
senior attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, made the following remarks
during Senate hearings:
EPA should take aggressive civil and criminal enforcement action
against repeat offenders, or particularly egregious offenders ...
Criminal action is particularly appropriate where conduct is willful,
where it is negligent and causes or threatens severe human health or
environmental effects, or for chronic violators. Criminal action should
also be taken where it will have important deterrent or punitive value,
and where it is believed that civil action alone will not achieve future
compliance. "
192. Id.
193. Devaney, supia note 4, at 33.
194. Id. at 34. The EPA has 10 regional offices located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver,
Kansas City, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. Each regional office contains an area
office of the Criminal Investigations Division of the Office of Criminal Enforcement.
195. Id. at 34.
196. Id. at 32.
[Vol. 48:237
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss2/5
CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The legislative history of a number of environmental statutes indicate Congres-
sional intent that criminal actions should not be taken against minor or inconsequen-
tial violations, but only in truly meritorious cases. " The conference notes of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments state:
EPA is authorized to initiate a range of enforcement actions for a
number of violations of specified sections and titles of the Act. Included
is authority to issue administrative penalty orders, file civil actions, and
initiate criminal proceedings via the Attorney General.
It is the conferee's intention to provide the Administrator with
prosecutorial discretion to decide not to seek sanctions under [this Act]
for de minimis or technical violations in civil and criminal matters. 9 '
Similar language can be found in the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
discussions on pesticide laws: "Civil penalty provisions are considered a necessary
part of a regulatory program such as pesticides control. While the Criminal
provisions may be used where circumstances warrant, the flexibility of having civil
remedies available provides an appropriate means of enforcement without subjecting
a person to criminal sanctions."'"
Even CERCLA enforcement actions are supposed to reserve criminal prosecutions
for the most serious violations. CERCLA's notice provision states: "[This section]
establishes, in addition to civil penalties, criminal penalties for any person who
knowingly fails to provide notice in accordance with [the section requiring notice].
Such criminal penalties, of course, would not be mandatory should EPA determine
that a violation has occurred, and standard prosecutorial discretion would apply."'
The critics of environmental prosecutions make two somewhat paradoxical
claims: (1) The EPA and DOJ have overzealously prosecuted individuals on
technical, relatively harmless violations of the law; and (2) have failed to prosecute
more meritorious cases against major corporate polluters or, when such polluters
have been prosecuted, they have been given lenient treatment.201
1. Unfair Selection of Cases
According to Judson W. Starr, the director of the Environmental Crimes Section
from 1982 to 1987, EPA's screening system for criminal prosecutions is not nearly
as effective as the EPA contends. Starr says that the way a case is handled often
197. Devaney, supra note 4, at 32.
198. Id. at 34 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 592, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3391, 3879).
199. Devaney, supra note 4, at 34.
200. l
201. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 871; see also Status of the Nation's Wetlands and Laws Related
Thereto: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 930-78, 1024-41, 1096-164 (1991); EPA's Criminal
Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) (commonly referred to as the 1992
Dingell Hearings).
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depends on whose desk the case first arrives. If the case is first reviewed by an
EPA regulatory employee, the case usually proceeds through administrative
channels. If, however, the case is initially handled by an EPA criminal investigator,
it tends to remain a criminal matter.'
Starr goes on to state: "Unable to predict how EPA will handle a violation, the
regulated community is faced with uncertainties that further complicate its efforts
at self-policing. Worse, the present system enhances the risk that different courts
will apply inconsistent sanctions to identical violations."''
Also, although more corporate entities and their officers are being targeted for
enforcement efforts, the targets are rarely the major corporations or their offi-
cers.' If major corporations are not being targeted for environmental prosecu-
tions, and, according to EPA statistics, criminal prosecutions are increasing each
year with more to come, farmers, ranchers, and small to medium-sized agribusiness-
es have reason to fear they are and will be the targets of many of these prosecu-
tions.
In support of their criticism of the government's selection process, critics can
point to a number of highly controversial and questionable criminal prosecutions.
Ironically, many of these controversial prosecutions involve farmers, ranchers, and
agribusinesses. The following is a brief summary of some of the cases:
Taung Ming-Lin, an immigrant from Taiwan, arrived in the United States in
1991 and purchased 720 acres of desert land near Bakersfield, California. He
planned to grow herbs and vegetables on what was described as barren soil.
Unfortunately for Lan, his property was listed as natural habitat for the Tipton
kangaroo rat, an endangered species. On Sunday, February 20, more than two dozen
state and federal agents, accompanied by helicopters, descended upon Lin's farm to
look for dead kangaroo rats. The agents supposedly found the remains of five rats
and charged Lin with violating the Endangered Species Act. Eventually, authorities
also accused him of farming San Joaquin kit foxes and blunt-nosed leopard lizards.
Authorities seized numerous farm tools belonging to Lin and even filed a lawsuit
against his Ford tractor which allegedly had killed the kangaroo rats. The authorities
threatened Lin with a three-year prison term and a $300,000 fine. They also
demanded that he give up title to 363 acres of his 723-acre holding for which he
had paid $1.5 million and that he pay another $172,425 to fund the operation of a
wildlife preserve on the land he was deeding to the government. It was only after
Lin suffered a mild stroke and the public expressed its outrage at the government's
treatment of Lin that the charges against him were dropped. The government
eventually agreed to only charge his corporation and finally settled with the
corporation for a payment of $5000 to a local habitat conservation fund.2m
202. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 913-14 (1991).
203. Id at 914.
204. Adler & Lord, supra note 40, at 796.
205. Russell Clemings, Species Law Enforcement Is Promised, FRESNO BEE, May 21, 1995, at BI;
Aaron Epstein, Friends, Foes of Law Tell Horror Stories to Court, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 1995,
at U2; Tony Snow, Species Cops Arrest Tractor, Sift Rat Parts, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 10, 1994, at
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0 William Ellen, a lifelong conservationist, received a six-month prison term for
creating ten duck ponds on Tudor Farms owned by Paul Tudor Jones II on
Maryland's eastern shore in Dorchester County. He was convicted of violating the
Clean Water Act by knowingly adding water to wetland areas. Ellen, a life-long
conservationist, opposes indiscriminate hunting, donates to the environmental group,
Greenpeace, and supports a Wildlife Fund sticker on the bumper of his Chevrolet
Blazer.
While working on the ten freshwater duck ponds for Tudor Farms, Ellen
consulted frequently with local state and federal agencies, obtaining thirty-eight
permits in the process. The oversight agencies he consulted included the Soil
Conservation Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, Maryland's Department of
Natural Resources, and Dorchester County's Zoning and Planning Boards, all of
which approved Tudor Farms' construction at some point. To supervise day to day
operations and to ensure that no wetlands were filled, Ellen hired two former natural
resources employees with experience in drawing state maps that delineated wetlands
from uplands.' Despite Ellen's precautions, the Corps of Engineers accused him
of damaging wetlands. The accusations against Ellen were made after the 1987
rules which expanded the technical meaning of wetlands and increased the wetland
acreage of Dorchester County from 84,000 acres to 259,000 acres. Ellen was
offered immunity from prosection if he would testify against Jones. Ellen refused
because he did not believe that anything wrong had been done. Federal prosecutors
then went ahead and prosecuted Ellen, obtained a conviction, and asked the court
to sentence Ellen to thirty-three months in prison, the maximum allowed under
federal guidelines. Ellen received a six-month prison term and Jones eventually paid
$2,000,000 in fines and restitution.'
0 In 1979, Paul Hobbs and his son, Paul Hobbs, Jr., began converting to
pastureland a wooded 205-acre tract of land located in eastern Virginia. The plan
used by the Hobbses to clear the land was prepared with the assistance of the U.S.
Soil Conservation Service. In 1988, an official with the U.S. Corps of Engineers
visited the site to determine if it was a wetland. He never informed the Hobbses of
his determination. Eventually the EPA charged the Hobbses with violating the Clean
Water Act in that they had illegally cleared and filled their property. The Hobbses
were convicted and the EPA asked the court to impose a $55,000 fine. The federal
judge imposed a fine of $300. Court attorney Frances S. Higgins defended the
prosecution, saying it was "what we're going to have to do to save this planet."'
* Ocie Mills and his son Cary spent most of 1989 and 1990 in jail for filling with
clean sand a dry ditch on their quarter acre Florida lot. In addition, Mills and his
son were each fined $10,000. The dry ditch was determined to be a wetland and the
sand to be a pollutant. According to documents obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act, officials of the Army Corps of Engineers were angry at Mills and
B7.
206. Richard Miniter, 'Wetlands' Send Man up the River, INSIGHT MAG., Dec. 14, 1992, at 6.
207. Id.
208. Commentary, Editorial, Swamped by EPA, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at F2.
1995]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
his son, whose criticisms of the Corps for the Corps efforts to regulate dry lands
had been highly publicized. After the Mills were released from jail, the
government attempted to also charge them for not removing the sand. Fortunately,
a federal judge rebuffed the government's efforts.
- In 1991, Missouri farmers James A. and Mary Ann Moseley were accused of
violating the Clean Water Act. The Moseleys unlawfully built a levee to prevent
their farm from flooding. Prosecutors sought a $25,000 a day criminal fine for
every day the levee was in place. The criminal fine totaled $14 million. The
government's wetlands expert testified that technically a Clean Water Act violation
would occur during a recreational game of softball played near the levee if a batter
knocked dirt from his shoes back onto the field. The jury voted to acquit."'
- Barry and Barbara Homer of New Jersey were charged by the New Jersey
Department of Enviionmental Protection and Energy (DEPE) with violating the
state's Dam Safety Act which became law in 1981. The act requires dam owners
to maintain their structures under new safety standards and to obtain a permit before
modifying their structures. The Homers contended they improved the dike on their
twenty-five-acre irrigation pond before the state's Dam Safety Act became law. The
Homer's dike and pond had been on the family farm since the 1760s, and repairs
were done every few years over the centuries as routine maintenance and for safety
precautions. According to the Homers, they had a safe impoundment long before
there was a law requiring property owners to maintain them. The DEPE acknowl-
edged that the commission did not question whether the Homers repairs were good
or bad, but simply vthether repairs were done in accordance with the Dam Safety
Act.
As a result of the DEPE action, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers decided to
take action against the Homers for violating section 401 of the Federal Clean Water
Act. The Corps contended the Homers failed to file an application with .the Corps
before repairing the dike. The Homers faced civil penalties and criminal fines of
up to $50,000 a day for each violation of the wetlands section of the Clean Water
Act.
21'
At the same time state and federal authorities were taking action against the
Homers, the Homer family farm was being honored by the state as a "pioneer
forester." Also, Mr. Homer is an acknowledged environmentalist. Since 1963 he
has been a member of the National Wildlife Association and has served as a
member of the Ocean Township Environmental Commission and the Citizen's
Conservation Council of Ocean County."'
- John Schuler and his wife own a sheep ranch near Dupuyer, Montana. They
lost approximately $1200 worth of sheep to marauding grizzly bears. Repeated
attempts by the government to stop the bears were unsuccessful. On the night of
209. Paul Craig Rob,-rts, Beware the Wetlands Stalkers, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1994, at A16.
210. Henderson, supra note 26.
211. Gordon Bishop, Fickle State Family Honored, Then Sued by DEPE, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
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September 9, 1993, Schuler thought he saw a bear running along the yard fence,
past his living room window. He raced outdoors in only his underwear and toting
a rifle. Three bears charged through his flock of sheep. Schuler fired at them at
which point a fourth bear appeared from the darkness and attacked him. Schuler
shot for the throat and retreated to his house. The next day he went outside
expecting to find a dead bear. Instead the bear was very much alive and attacked
Schuler again. Fearing for his life, Schuler shot and killed the bear. The Interior
Department assessed Schuler a $7000 penalty for taking a bear in violation of the
Endangered Species Act. The judge rejected Schuler's argument that he was simply
protecting his life. According to the court, Schuler purposefully placed himself in
the zone of imminent danger of a bear attack and was really protecting his property
rather than his life. The judge did, however, reduce Schuler's fine to $4000.213
- Nevada rancher Wayne Hage was threatened with a five-year sentence under
the Clean Water Act for redirecting streams. Hage's crime consisted of hiring
someone to clear scrub brush from irrigation ditches on his property. The ditches
had been in use since the turn of the century.214
* A case which generated substantial controversy in Colorado involved two
Carbondale brothers accused of violating wetlands regulations. To prevent the
flooding of their land and the loss of top soil, they rebuilt a restraining wall on their
land. This was done after consulting their attorney. The Corps of Engineers sought
a penalty of $45 million against the brothers based on $25,000 a day penalty.
2 5
- A Florida citrus company agreed to pay a $40,000 fine and restore some of the
forty acres of native habitat on the Santa Clara river it bulldozed. The company
president, Glen Griswold, said the company did not know it had broken the law by
clearing land it owned along the river. The company had received a permit from the
flood control department for the work, but had failed to get permits from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and the California Department of Fish and Game. The
district attorney's office of Consumer and Environmental Prosecution, which
prosecuted the case, said ignorance was not a legal excuse for violating the law 6
- The Simpson Timber Company for years conducted tours of its Sacramento
Valley eucalyptus plantation. The 12,000 acre tree farm was shown to school
children, civic groups, the University of California forestry faculty and federal
environmental experts. To Simpson's surprise, and surprised officials of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service with whom Simpson has worked in preserving habitat for
the endangered fairy shrimp, the EPA in January of 1995 appeared with a search
warrant and formal charges that Simpson had been systematically destroying
wetlands.217
213. Ike C. Sugg, Rule of If a Grizzly Attacks, Drop Your Gun, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1993, at A15.
214. Henderson, supra note 26, at 18.
215. Sherry Keene-Osborne, Has Environmental Zeal Gone Too Far?, COLO. Bus. MAG., Apr. 1992,
at 43.
216. Scott Hadly, Fillmore Finn to Pay Fine and Restore Habitat, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993, at
2.
217. Frank Clifford, Raising the Price of Protecting Nature: Does Government Too Zealously
Regulate Private Property? Some Say Making U.S. Pay Owners When Land Is Devalued Could Curb
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2. Justice or Extortion
Since 1991, the EPA has had a policy on the use of Supplemental Environmental
Projects (SEPs) in enforcement agreements. SEPs are defined as projects, other than
those required to correct the underlying violation, which a defendant in judicial
proceedings or respondent in administrative proceedings may undertake in exchange
for a reduction in the amount of the assessed penalty."'8 Acceptable SEPs include
projects of: pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restoration,
environmental auditing, and public awareness. In 1993, private expenditures
compelled by injunctions or negotiated as part of SEPs adopted to settle violations
totaled $800 million!"
Given the extensive use of SEPs, the suspicion naturally arises as to whether
some SEPs are not a trade off for the EPA and DOJ foregoing criminal prosecu-
tions. Certainly, the threat of the filing of a criminal action would be a strong
incentive for a defendant to accept a civil settlement and engage in a costly SEP.
Also, in a number of criminal cases, the government has proposed settlements in
which substantial donations to environmental causes have been exacted from
defendants or in which attempts to exact such settlements have been made. The
following two examples raise serious questions about the propriety of the
government's conduct. In the case involving Bill Ellen and multi-millionaire Paul
Tudor Jones, as part of the deal in which Jones received 18 months of probation,
he agreed to make a $1 million contribution to the National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation.2
In the case filed against Taung Ming-Lin for allegedly killing kangaroo rats, the
government threatened Ming-Lin with a $300,000 fine and a three-year prison term.
As part of a proposed settlement of the criminal charges, the government demanded
that he give up title to 363 acres of his 720-acre holding for which he had paid $1.5
million. The government also demanded that he pay another $172,425 to fund the
operation of a wildlife preserve on the acreage he was to deed to the government.
Intense cries of public outrage finally forced the government to settle for a $5000
donation to a local habitat conservation fund.2
In a 1994 case involving Emmett Runde, a swine producer accused of polluting
a Wisconsin stream, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources fined Runde
$5000 and as part of the process publicly humiliated him. Instead of asking for a
Excesses, Others Fear It Would Gut Enforcement, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 1.
218. James J. Perioni & David Nelson, The Precedent Setting Use of a Pollution Prevention Project
in a Pollution Prevention Froject in an EPA Enforcement Settlement: The First Dollar-for-Dollar Penalty
Offset, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2049, 2050 (Apr. 1, 1994).
219. Id.
220. Henderson, supra note 26, at 19.
221. Kent Ward, Endangered Species Case Teaches Lesson, BANGOR DAILY NEws (Bangor, Me.,
June 24, 1995, available at 1995 WL 8763339. According to Dale Mitchell, an environmentalist with
the California Department of Fish and Game, some developers have been able to get permits for the
"incidental taking" of endangered species by deeding over three acres of land for every acre taken in
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donation to an environmental organization or money for an environmental project,
the state required Runde to write and publish the following letter:
A NOTICE TO MY FELLOW FARMERS:
Water quality protection is the responsibility of everybody, including
farmers. I understand that now.
For over 10 years I have known that at times my farm has been a
source of water pollution. I constructed a manure pit that was inade-
quate to protect the stream running through my farm. Manure repeated-
ly entered the stream and polluted the water. The Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) issued me a notice advising me of this problem. The
Grant County Land Conservation Department, the Soil Conservation
Service, and the Wisconsin Departments of Agriculture and Natural
Resources all tried to help, but I did not fix the manure pit at that time.
The DNR issued a Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit which I did not comply with.
The state filed a lawsuit against me and now I have agreed to a court
order not to use my hog buildings because I did not protect the stream.
I have also incurred substantial penalties.
I urge all farmers to take whatever actions they can to protect the
environment. A WPDES permit is designed to protect streams and lakes
and it contains a number of requirements that are very important and
should be complied with. It is better to listen to the local, state and
federal regulatory agencies and to take their advice. I know that now.
If I had realized this ten years ago I would have saved myself and the
DNR a lot of trouble, and, at the same time, I would have done a better
job protecting the waters of the State of Wisconsin.
Emmett Runde
Cuba City
Many individuals accused of environmental crimes have no choice but to accept
whatever settlement proposal is made by the government. They simply lack the
financial resources to do otherwise. Oklahoma criminal defense attorney, Jarry
McCombs, estimates that a competent environmental defense costs between
222. HERALD INDEPENDENT, June 2, 1994, at A16. Actually, mea culpa letters might not be a bad
idea, so long as the government is required to issue similar letters whenever it drops, loses, or has a case
dismissed. The government's mea culpa letter should also be accompanied by a check reimbursing the
former criminal defendant for all attorneys fees and other costs expended in his or her defense.
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$250,000 and $500,000. In a RCRA case against an aircraft painting and repair
shop, McCombs said the defendant spent $300,000 to have his conviction
overturned on appeal. The federal government spent $468,000 on its prosecu-
tion.m
3. Diminished Mere- Rea
Much of the criticism of the criminal enforcement of environmental laws revolves
around the issue of mens rea. The common law generally did not condemn acts as
criminal unless the actor had "an evil purpose or mental culpability." m In
addition, under common law an accused can only be convicted upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with the "specific intent" to violate the
law, in other words, that the accused acted with a conscious objective to cause the
specific result proscribed by the statute.'
In comparison, environmental offenses require only a diminished mens rea. The
United States Suprem-. Court and the courts of appeal have generally held that the
government can prove that a defendant "knowingly violated" a particular environ-
mental standard withcut proving either that defendant knew of the applicable legal
standard and its violation or of all the relevant facts underlying its violation.' The
diminished mens rea requirement in environmental criminal cases is justified under
the doctrine that environmental crimes are public welfare offenses.'
4. Additional Arguments Against the Environmental Criminal Prosecutions
Include:
* Environmental standards are not necessarily based on traditional notions of
criminal culpability. Environmental standards are set at precautionary, risk-averse
levels of protection against risk to human health and the environment.'
- Standards of compliance do not necessarily reflect standards of performance that
are either economically or technologically feasible. As a result, full compliance with
environmental laws is the exception rather than the norm.'
- Criminal sanctions are more than just another enforcement tool. A criminal
sanction is fundamentally different in character than a civil sanction and should be
reserved for the more. culpable offenses.4'
- Environmental laws are extraordinarily complex and therefore difficult to
understand. The laws include Congressional micromanagement, broad delegation of
authority to the EPA, thousands of implementing regulations, guidance documents,
223. Henderson, supra note 26, at 22.
224. Richard Lazarus, A New Faultline-Mens Rea, 12 ENVTL. FORUM 9 (1995). See also M. Diane
Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter Under Environmental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 105, 144-47 (1992).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971).
228. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 881.
229. Id. at 882.
230. Id. at 883.
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judicial opinions, and letters of agency interpretation. In addition, these laws are
constantly expanding through creative interpretation as evidenced by the expanding
definition of wetlands.'
5. Counter Productive
Besides questions of fundamental fairness, some people believe that the prospect
of a jail sentence actually discourages companies from reporting environmental
accidents that could be cleaned up before they caused harm. In noting that a
cooperative corporate officer may be cutting his or her own throat by reporting an
environmental accident, Donald Hensel, then head of environmental compliance at
the American Newspaper Association, stated in 1991: "Government regulators may
not be interested in working with the industry to achieve compliance. They may use
jail sentences as a mechanism to enforce compliance."'
An unduly cooperative approach may sacrifice the legal rights of the company
and its employeesY3 The same is true as to individuals accused of environmental
crimes.
III. Reactions to Environmental Crimes Prosecutions
Federal and state environmental enforcement agencies believe they have strong
public and political support of the vigorous prosecutions of environmental crimes.
Certainly, there is both public and political support for punishing a company such
as Exxon after an Exxon Valdez disaster which caused enormous ecological and
financial damage. Few would argue with charging Exxon with criminal fines in
excess of $600 million.m
A. Public Reaction
But although few would question the imposition of a large criminal fine imposed
on Exxon, many question the wisdom and fairness of filing criminal actions against
someone like William Ellen, 5 Taung Ming-Lin,"6 or Ocie MillsY7
231. James V. DeLong, New Crimes, High Fines: The Criminalization of Nearly Everything,
CURRENT, Sept. 1994, at 21. In 1993 the National Law Journal and Arthur Anderson Environmental
Services surveyed more than 200 corporate counsels as to the ability of corporations to comply with
environmental laws. Seventy percent said that full compliance with all state and federal environmental
laws was impossible. Two-thirds said that their companies had violated environmental regulations within
the past year. Such a response is not surprising given the fact that the Clean Air Act alone has produced
60,000 to 80,000 pages of regulations. Henderson, supra note 26, at 19.
232. Henderson, supra note 26, at 19 (quoting Donald Hensel from remarks made in 1991 before
the ANPA's convention).
233. Id.
234. Adler & Lord, supra note 40, at 781-84.
235. Commentary, Do You Sleep Better Now That Ellen's In Jail?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at
F2; H. Jane Lehman, Trials and Tribulations of Landowners Series: This Land Is My Land: The
Property Rights Movement in the United States. Part 3 Probes What Happens When Property Rights are
Taken to an Extreme, Including Visits With Some Landowners Now Behind Bars, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1992, at 2; Real Estate Notes, Maryland Wetlands Conviction Stirring Heated Debate, WASH. POST, Feb.
20, 1993, at F06; Review and Outlook. EPA's Most Wanted, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1992, at A16.
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And it is not just the editorial writers, farmers, ranchers, agribusinesses, and farm
organizations, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, 8 who have become
critical of environmental criminal prosecutions. 9 Sen. Diane Feinstein (D.-Cal.)
was incensed by the government's treatment of Mr. Lin. She contacted Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt to enquire as to why the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
didn't work out an agreement with Lin. She further stated "There is something
terribly wrong when a man is arrested and faced with jail time, hundreds of
thousands of dollars in fines and loss of property because he inadvertently killed a
rat while plowing his field."'
At the time of Ellen's conviction, Sen. David Pryor (D.-Ark.) called upon then
President Bush to pardon Ellen. Senator Pryor expressed his concern that Arkansas
farmers would be victimized in similar litigation with federal prosecutors and
agencies. Senator Pryor stated, "In my opinion, Ellen's story is a prime example of
the strange and twisted consequences that can result from a bureaucracy out of
touch with reality."'"
Senator Feinstein wrote to EPA administrator Carol Browner in regard to the
Simpson case. She stated: "I find EPA's enforcement action overbearing and
unwarranted. This is the kind of federal agency action which is causing the public
and the Congress to question all federal environmental regulation.""2
It is especially difficult for the public to accept the jailing of persons whose
violations do not truly endanger the public health, safety, or welfare. Former Justice
Department attorney, Mark L. Pollott, states, "In 99 percent of the cases that the
Contra Commentary, Don't Call Bill Ellen an Eco-Martyr, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1993, at B2; Tom
Horton, A Closer Look at the Case of an 'Eco-Martyr, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 26, 1993, at IF.
236. Snow, supra ncte 205, at B7; Ward, supra note 221; Ray Sotero column, Gannett News Serv.,
May 15, 1995, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 2897060. Contra Editorials, Letters, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 21, 1995, at F05.
237. Roberts, supra note 209, at A16; see also Charles S. Cushman, Debate on the Environment,
Mean Green Team Carries Out Cultural Genocide, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at F6.
238. Don Muhm, Farm Bureau Convening, is Wary of Regulations American Farm Bureau
Federation President Deam Kleckner of lowa Expects Voting Delegates to Speak Out Against Government
Rules, DES MOINEs REG,, Jan. 10, 1993, at 1.
239. The backlash against criminal prosecutions of environmental violators includes many attorneys.
In 1993 the California Lawyer featured a special section on environmental law with articles entitled
Robert Wyman, The Truth: There Are No Environmental Crimes,' Enforcement Laws Tilt in Favor of
Prosecutors, 13 CAL. LAm. 89 (1993); David P. Bancroft, Faulty 'Priority'Prosecutions: Federal Statutes
Treat Mere Negligence As Crime, 13 CAL. LAw. 93 (1993). One attorney wrote, "When the
crininalization of neglig.-nce is coupled with the criminal law doctrines of vicarious liability, roping in
"responsible corporate cfficers" who knew nothing about the alleged crime, the result can be truly
draconian." Henderson, supra note 26, at 24 (quoting David P. Bancroft, partner with Sideman &
Bancroft in San Francisco).
240. David Kligman, Feinstein Backs Farmer in Rat-Habitat Incident: Agriculture: The Senator
Wants Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt to Resolve Taung Ming-Lin's Case, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.)
REG., Sept. 1, 1994, at BOB.
241. Review & Outlook. The Ellen Pardon, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1993, at AI0.
242. Frank Clifford, Raising the Price of Protecting Nature Does Government Too Zealously
Regulate Private Property? Some Say Making U.S. Pay Owners When Land is Devalued Could Curb
Excesses. Others Fear it Would Gut Enforcement, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 1.
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Corps regulates, there is no threat of a pollutant getting into drinking water. Most
often the pollutant in question is dirt, and usually dirt dumped on the same land it
was dug from." 43
Also, many of the major corporations have avoided both jail time for their
executives and felony charges. Although Exxon faced substantial criminal fines after
the Exxon Valdez disaster, the charges were all misdemeanors and no corporate
officials were charged. Not only did the government not indict senior Exxon
management and other corporate officers, it also elected not to indict the consortium
of oil companies, Alaska Pipeline, Service Co., which was responsible for
responding to the oil spill and failed to properly do so.' "
Between 1984 and 1991, only 1.6% of the nation's 500 largest industrial
corporations, the so-called Fortune 500, had ever been prosecuted for environmental
damage. It is rather remarkable that companies which produce over 54% of the
nonfarm gross national product could be responsible for less than 2% of the nation's
environmental violations.45
B. Political Fallout
Political fallout over the criminal enforcement of the nation's environmental laws
has also occurred. Although the EPA and DOJ may want to believe that criticism
of their prosecutorial efforts is primarily a result of the efforts of the Republicans,
the criticism is bipartisan as demonstrated in the remarks of Democratic Senators
Feinstein and Pryor. In addition, questionable criminal prosecutions are having an
effect on federal legislation. For example, the Endangered Species Act is under
serious attack and may not be reauthorized. And, even if it is, it may be drastically
modified. Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.) has introduced a bill that would abolish
criminal fines or imprisonment for those who destroy an endangered species'
habitat.m
One Clean Water bill in the U.S. House of Representatives would dramatically
reduce criminal prosecutions under the CWA.' 7 House Bill 961, for example,
permits a new defense-statistical noncompliance.' Companies have long
contended that EPA's compliance standards are based on the assumption that a
certain number of dischargers will violate the standards a certain percentage of the
time. The statistical noncompliance defense would prohibit dischargers from being
punished for that percentage of violations. 9
243. Miniter, supra note 206, at 8.
244. Adler & Lord, supra note 40, at 783-84.
245. Il at 796.
246. William K. Stevens, Law Aiding Imperiled Species is in Danger, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB.,
May 16, 1995, at Al.
247. H.R. 961, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
248. Id. § 404.
249. H.R. 961 Raises Concerns by EPA, Justice over Effects on Federal Enforcement Efforts, 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) 460 (June 23, 1995).
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House Bill 961 also makes it harder for the federal government to bring criminal
charges in wetlands violations. It requires the Corps of Engineers to file suit within
a specified time as to a violation or be barred from pursuing it5
The greatest danger, however, to the EPA's criminal enforcement measures comes
from proposed budget cuts. Dissatisfaction over EPA enforcement activities, both
civil and criminal, has resulted in dramatic proposals in Congress to drastically cut
the EPA's budget for fiscal year 1996. The House has proposed a 34% budget
reduction from $7.27 billion to $4.87 billion 1 The Senate proposal is to cut the
EPA's budget to $5.66 billion.,m Both the House and Senate have proposed a
reduction in Superfund expenditures to $1 billion.53 In addition, the House has
proposed a $450 million reduction in enforcement programs.'
C. Judicial Reaction
Even the judiciary is beginning to question some of the criminal prosecutions by
the EPA and the DOJ. In a number of recent decisions, the federal courts have
expressed dissatisfaction with the general intent mens rea standard currently
applicable to environmental crimes. It is interesting that the dissatisfaction is being
expressed by both conservative and liberal jurists. In United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 5 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a classic
diminished mens rea jury instruction in a Clean Water Act prosecution. Five
dissenting justices, however, discussed the special difficulties inherent in the
wholesale criminalization of a regulatory scheme as complex as environmental
law5'
Even more significant is a majority opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas
in the case of Staples v. U.S.' Although the case did not involve an environmen-
tal crime, Justice Thomas stated that mens rea has traditionally been a necessary
element in every crime and cited authority for the view that some indication of
Congressional intent, expressed or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea
as an element of a crime 5 8
Justice Thomas further stated:
250. Id. at 460-61.
251. GOP Seeking to Cut EPA Budget by One-Third, Eliminate CEQ, Limit Environmental
Programs, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 549, 549 (June 14, 1995).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 551.
254. Carol M. Browner, EPA administrator, has characterized the budget proposal as "the clearest
indication to date that the Republican Congress is about undermining this agency's ability to perform its
responsibility for the American people." Il at 549. President Clinton has threatened to veto the
appropriations bills of the EPA and Department of Interior if more funding is not provided. President
Would Veto Pending Bills for EPA, Interior, Head of CEQ Says, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 938 (Sept. 22,
1995).
255. 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86
(9th Cir. 1993).
256. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1293-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
257. 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
258. Id. at 1796-97.
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If we were to accept as a general rule the Government's suggestion
that dangerous and regulated items place their owners under an
obligation to inquire at their peril into compliance with regulations, we
would undoubtedly reach some untoward results. Automobiles, for
example, might also be termed "dangerous" devices and are highly
regulated at both the state and federal levels. Congress might see fit to
criminalize the violation of certain regulations concerning automobiles,
and thus might make it a crime to operate a vehicle without a properly
functioning emission control system. But we probably would hesitate
to conclude on the basis of silence that Congress intended a prison term
to apply to a car owner whose vehicle's emissions levels, wholly
unbeknownst to him, began to exceed legal limits between regular
inspection dates.
The court went on to express doubt about the lesser mens rea applied in public
welfare offenses, including environmental offenses, noting that such regulatory
offenses have formerly been punished with small penalties.' The court concluded
that punishing a violation as a felony is incompatible with the theory of a public
welfare offense, absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not
required. '
Regardless of the criticism of the continued criminalization of environmental law
and ever more burdensome penalties, the current trend is towards increased criminal
prosecutions at the federal and state level. As a result, farmers, ranchers, and
officers in agribusinesses need to know what they can do to protect themselves, and
also what will not protect them.
IV. Individual and Corporate Liability
As already explained, the current criminal provisions of environmental laws
require only a diminished mens rea for criminal culpability. In addition, environ-
mental laws stress both individual and corporate liability for environmental crimes.
A favorite legal device used by business people to protect their personal assets
from liability claims is the corporate structure. A corporation is an "artificial
person" and constitutes a separate legal entity. Many farmers have incorporated
their fanning operations in order to take advantage of the liability protection offered
by the corporate structure. Even those states with anti-corporate farming statutes
permit family farm operations to incorporate in order to take advantage of the
limited personal liability offered by the corporate structure. But the corporate
structure is not an effective shield for individual liability in environmental cases.
Many of the cases cited in this section are civil in nature, but the legal doctrines
expressed are applicable to criminal prosecutions.
259. Id. at 1801-02.
260. Id. at 1802-03.
261. Id. at 1801-02.
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A. Traditional Doctrine
Obviously, corporations can be held liable for environmental damage. It is a basic
theory of corporate law that a corporation is a separate entity, a legal being with an
existence separate and distinct from that of its owners. As a separate legal entity,
it can act and be held accountable for its actions. 2 Of course, being an artificial
being, with "no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked," a corporation can
act only through its employees.' Corporations are thus held liable for their
employees' conduct through the doctrine of respondent superior.
It is also a fundamental characteristic of corporations that corporate owners are
protected by limited liability. Shareholders and their personal wealth are insulated
to some extent from the risks associated with owning a business enterprise. Other
corporate actors, such as officers and parent corporations, have been similarly
shielded from personal liability from the tortious or illegal acts of their corporations.
But the corporate business form does not offer complete protection and in
appropriate circumstances the corporate veil may be pierced to impose liability upon
those corporate actors who have traditionally been protected.'
With ever greater frequency, courts are willing to go beyond traditional legal
doctrines and hold parent corporations, corporate officials, and even shareholders
liable as well. This is especially true of federal courts in enforcing environmental
laws.' Although some commentators argue that expanding the scope of liability
beyond the immediate corporation doing the environmental harm is in accordance
with traditional corporate law doctrine, there is no denying the tendency of courts
to expand the scope of liable parties in environmental cases.'
B. Shareholder Liability
Corporate shareholders expect their maximum liability exposure to be limited to
their capital contributions. But there are circumstances in which the corporate veil
can be pierced, such as where a corporation has been illegally formed, or is used
for fraudulent or unjust purposes. Also, if shareholders ignore the corporate form
and use the corporation for their own purposes, the courts can pierce the corporate
veil under an alter ego theory.'
262. See generally iARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 68, 73 (3rd ed. 1983); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 262.
263. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick." An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward, First Baron
Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England).
264. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 262-63; see also David H. Barber, Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 17 WILLumErrE L. REv. 371 (1981).
265. Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in
Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1988).
266. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 262 (defending the expansion of liability in
environmental cases to co-porate officers, shareholders, parent corporations and successor corporations).
Contra M. Patricia Casey, Pollution Claims Against Directors and Officers Arising from Environmental
Hazards, 4 ENVr'L CLAIMS J. 81, 81 (1991) (noting that many commentators predict environmental
claims against directors anid officers to be the wave of the future).
267. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 295-96; see also WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
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In United States v. Mottolo,u the corporate veil was pierced to impose liability
on an individual shareholder. The defendant originally operated a waste disposal site
as a sole proprietorship. By his own admission, he incorporated his business to
"escape potential personal liability by using the corporate entity as a shield."'
The defendant's plan failed as the court pierced the corporate veil in order to hold
the defendant, who was the corporation's shareholder, personally liable under
CERCLA for illegally disposing hazardous waste.'
While the Mottolo decision involved a closely held corporation, theoretically the
doctrines set forth in the case could apply to publicly traded corporations as well.
Shareholders in publicly traded corporations, however, are in little danger of being
held personally liable for environmental damage since they lack'the unity of interest
and ownership necessary to sustain an alter ego theory.2 '
Also, the courts have not imposed direct statutory liability on shareholders under
such statutes as CERCLA. For example, shareholders have never been defined as
"owners or operators" in accordance with section 107(a)(1). There is also no
evidence that Congress intended to impose CERCLA liability on shareholders.'m
C. Liability of Corporate Officers
With ever greater frequency, corporate officers are being individually targeted in
environmental claims. Even when acting within the scope and course of his/her
corporate duties, individual corporate officers are being held personally liable for
environmental damage under a number of legal theories.
1. Personal Participation Theory
An individual who personally participates in violating an environmental law, such
as CERCLA, may be held personally liable regardless of their status as a corporate
officer.2' The best example of this personal participation theory is found in the
case of United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO I).4 The case involved the improper disposal of the chemical dioxin
in the Times Beach, Missouri area. As a result of the dioxin contamination, the
federal government and the state of Missouri initiated a multi-million-dollar
environmental cleanup of various contaminated sites in Missouri. The cost to the
federal government was $33.7 million, while the state of Missouri paid $3.3
million.27 A chemical manufacturer, two of its officers, and a waste transporter
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10, at 615 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
268. 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
269. Id. at 624.
270. Id.
271. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 296, 298.
272. Id. at 299, 301.
273. Id. at 275.
274. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, modified in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
275. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1182 n.2
(8th Cir. 1987) (NEPACCO II).
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were held jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs under section 107 of
CERCLA.
The chemical manufacturing company's vice-president was found liable as both
a generator under section 107(3) of CERCLA and as an owner and operator under
section 107(a)(1)." The court rejected the vice-president's defense that he could
not be held liable since the waste was owned by NEPACCO. The court found that
he "had the responsibility to and did arrange for the disposal of the hazardous
waste" and that was sufficient to hold the vice-president liable for cleanup costs.2"
2. Control Theory
Corporate officers can also be held liable for environmental damage under a
control theory. For example, in NEPACCO I the chemical company's president was
personally liable for cleanup costs because he had the ability to control corporate
activities and policies;. This was true even though the evidence showed that the
president was not present at the plant at the time of the illegal disposal and the
government was unable to show that the president had any prior knowledge of the
illegal practices.2'
Since NEPACCO I, a number of other decisions have been handed down
imposing liability on corporate officers under a control theory. An analysis of the
cases suggests that managerial control from an officer status is not sufficient to
create liability. The courts look to see if the officer had operational control, or




Closely analogous to the participation and control theories is the prevention
theory. This theory is articulated in Kelley v. ARCO Industries Corp."' In
imposing liability on corporate officers, the ARCO court acknowledged that relevant
factors include the individual's power to control corporate practices and policies, as
well as the individual's actual efforts expended in that regard.~2 The court further
held, however, that the question to be answered in imposing personal liability is
"whether the individual in a closely held corporation could have prevented or
significantly abated the release of hazardous substances."'
Although the ARCO court dealt with a closely held corporation, the reasoning
could apply to corporations in general. However, in a case involving a closed
276. See NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 828.
277. Id. at 847-848.
278. I at 849.
279. Id.
280. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 284; see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D.
Mich 1987).
281. 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
282. ld at 1220.
283. d; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 116, at 292.
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corporation, it would probably be much easier to measure an individual's prevention
abilities.
V. Environmental Compliance Programs
Given the severe civil and criminal law consequences associated with environ-
mental claims, ensuring compliance with environmental laws is critical to a farmer's
survival. Like any other business operation, a farmer must have an environmental
compliance program. The following material highlights some compliance measures
which can be taken by farmers. Farmers can receive help in putting together an
environmental compliance program from such organizations as Farm*A*Syst.'
A. The Basics
While any compliance needs to be tailored to the needs of each agricultural
operation, and some operations which are not particularly vulnerable to environmen-
tal actions may need a relatively simple compliance program, there are some basic
rules to be followed.2
1. Articulate an Environmental Policy and Communicate It
There must be a written farm policy as to environmental issues and it must be
communicated to all employees. Also, the policy must be adhered to and be visibly
supported by farm management.'
2. Resource Allocation and Training
A farmer must be willing to allocate money and personnel to environmental
compliance. A farmer also must be devoted to the continued training of personnel
responsible for environmental compliance.' While this obviously entails
considerable expense on the part of a farm operation, the severe consequences
associated with environmental claims leave no alternative but to make a major
business commitment in this area.
Also, some training requirements are mandated by RCRA, SARA, and OSHA.
In other words, it is the law. For example, RCRA regulations require treatment,
storage, and disposal facility personnel to have expertise in their areas of
assignment." S
284. The Farm*A*Syst program is a unique partnership between state and federal professionals from
the Extension Service, Soil Conservation Service, and EPA. The program was created to provide farmers
and rural residents with the ability to identify and reduce drinking water and groundwater contamination.
Farm*A*Syst currently operates in 18 states, with another 17 starting the development process. For more
information contact: The National Farm*A*Syst Staff, B-142 Skeenbock Library, 550 Babcock Drive,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, (608)262-0024.
285. S. Richard Heymann, Watch What You Discharge: The Government Is (Stricter Enforcement
of Environmental Laws Affecting Dairy Companies), 95 DAIRY FOODS 44 (July 7, 1994).
286. R.W. Michaud, Human Resources Management, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY
MANAGER'S HANDBOOK 19, 20 (1988).
287. Id.
288. Thomas F.P. Sullivan, Environmental Training and Education, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
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The 1986 Superfind amendments on SARA require OSHA to promulgate training
requirements to protect workers. Employers must comply with the regulations. The
regulations cover workers involved in cleanup responses under CERCLA and
RCRA.m
OSHA has over 100 standards with some training requirements. OSHA has also
promulgated a right-to-know law as to employees exposed to hazardous chemicals.
Many states have similar such laws.'
3. Discipline
An effective environmental compliance program must include adequate discipline.
Employees who will not follow the program must be put into positions where they
have no responsibility for environmental compliance. In many cases, it will be best
to simply terminate the employment of an employee who does not appreciate the
importance of environmental compliance."
4. Design and Implement Audit or Assessment Programs
While such programs are unique to each business, there are some basic and
common elements which could be found in all such programs. An audit program
should measure environmental compliance systematically. It should provide
assurance to farm management that relevant regulatory requirements are being met.
Auditors will typically perform the following duties:
- Ascertain the maintenance of schedules and records as to all operations with
environmental compliance requirements.
- Inspect facilities and equipment, as well as evaluate personnel performance to
assure adherence to institutional standards;
* Make written reports to management explaining any deviations from the farm's
environmental policy and make recommendations for corrective action.2'
To ensure the integrity of an audit, it should be conducted by independent
auditors. This means that the auditors should come from outside the company or,
if an audit is done internally, it should be conducted by persons outside the chain
of command of the facilities which they are auditing.' The integrity of an
internal audit requires that those conducting the audit be adequately trained for the
purpose, be properly staffed, and be supported by top management.' Audits
should be conducted at least once a year, but preferably every six months or even
quarterly depending on the operation and its vulnerability to environmental claims.
& SArETY MANAGER'S HANDBOOK 31, 34 (1988).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Martha E. Candiello, What Is an "Effective" Environmental Compliance Plan Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 2 CORP. CONDUCr Q. 39, 40 (1992).
292. G.A. West, How Do I Protect My Company, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY
MANAGER'S HANDBOOi: 127, 134 (Thomas F. Sullivan & G. David Williams eds., 1988).
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5. Timely Follow Up
Timely follow up is critical to a good compliance program. Difficulties and
environmental violations revealed by the audit require prompt remedial action. 5
One of the worst things an agricultural operation could do would be to ignore the
findings of its own audit by failing to take remedial action.
6. Documentation
Documentation is a necessity in an environmental program. Documentation
should include a statement of the operation's environmental policies and procedures,
a description of the training program, and who has been trained, dates, and results
of audits and corrective action taken, complaints of third parties and responses to
those complaints.' Many operations find themselves at a disadvantage in dealing
with regulators and prosecutors because they fail to document their environmental
compliance.
B. Benefits and Disadvantages
Environmental compliance programs offer farmers, ranchers, and agribusinesses
both advantages and disadvantages. On the whole, the advantages outweigh the
disadvantages. This is certainly true if the information contained in an audit is
privileged. But the issue of privilege is one currently being debated between the
EPA and federal and state governments.
1. Practical
The primary benefit of a corporate compliance program is preventive in character.
By instituting an effective compliance program, many environmental mistakes can
be avoided, as well as the accompanying legal liability associated with such
mistakes. But there are other practical benefits to be derived from a compliance
program.
Environmental compliance programs can:
" improve internal management practices;
" improve production processes and efficiency;
" train employees in environmental compliance and more efficient production
processes;
" improve risk management practices;
• increase waste minimizations;
• provide data regarding cost of regulatory compliance useful for promoting
regulatory reform at the local, state, and federal level;
* improve company public relations and market perceptions; and
" mitigate civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance.
295. Id.
296. Ud.
297. Kenneth D. Woodrow, The Proposed Federal Environmental Sentencing Guidelines: A Model
For Corporate Environmental Compliance Programs, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 326 (June 17, 1994).
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2. Legal - In General
Thus far, the courts have failed to give compliance programs the legal signifi-
cance they deserve. Some commentators have criticized the failure of the courts to
give more legal significance to compliance programs and have noted that this failure
actually decreases the incentive of companies to effectively supervise their
employees."'
There is also an interesting irony as far as environmental actions based on
negligence and compliance with environmental statutes is concerned. Many courts
have accepted the arguments of plaintiffs that the failure to comply with environ-
mental regulations constitutes negligence per se. In other words, the environmental
regulations set the standard of care. However, the reverse is not true. Compli-
ance with government statutes does not necessarily prevent a finding of negligence.
Many courts hold that statutes, ordinances, and regulations only establish a
minimum floor of acceptable conduct. Compliance only serves as evidence of an
exercise of due care and will not defeat a negligence claim if a reasonable person
would have taken additional precautions.'
But compliance programs are being used in mitigation of civil and criminal
penalties for noncompliance. There are indications that the EPA and the DOJ are
attaching increased importance to such programs.
3. The EPA Position
The EPA is actively encouraging the development and implementation of
compliance programs. On January 12, 1994, the EPA's Office of Criminal
Enforcement published a guidance document as to the EPA's exercise of investiga-
tive discretion."' According to the memo, violations which are discovered and
remedied as a result of a corporation's compliance program will not ordinarily result
in a criminal prosecution. Conversely, a criminal prosecution is appropriate if a
corporation fails to implement remedial recommendations made in an audit.'
4. The DOJ Position
In July 1991, the DOJ released its criminal environmental enforcement policy."'
The policy is entitled "Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environ-
mental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure
298. See Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990).
299. See Shelia G. l3ush, Can You Get There From Here?: Noncompliance With Environmental
Regulations As Negligence Per Se in Tort Cases, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1988-89).
300. See Paul Dueffrt, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 175, 175 (1989).
301. Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement (Jan. 12,
1994).
302. Id.
303. Kenneth D. Woodrow, The Proposed Federal Environmental Compliance Programs, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 325, 326 (June 17, 1995).
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Efforts by the Violator." U.S. attorneys are instructed to consider the following
mitigating factors in exercising prosecutorial discretion:
" voluntary disclosure of environmental violations;
" cooperation with the government's investigation; and
" implementation of preventive measures and compliance programs.
3
W
The DOJ has formulated guidelines for compliance programs.35 A compliance
program should include:
" an institutional policy to comply with environmental laws;
* implementation of safeguards beyond those required by existing law;
• regular internal and external audits of compliance;
" timely implementation of auditor's recommendation;
" dedication of adequate company resources;
" effective system of disciplining employees' participating in unlawful activities;
and
. corporate policy of rewarding employees' contribution to environmental
compliance.'
5. Problems With the EPA and the DOJ Positions
The main problem with both the EPA's and the DOJ's position on environmental
compliance programs is that they are nonbinding. There is no guarantee the
implementation of a compliance program and the voluntary disclosure of violations
will not result in criminal investigation. In addition, the information disclosed to the
government is not confidential. The government may use the information in a
criminal, civil, or administrative action, or turn it over to state or local authori-
ties.3"
Critics of voluntary compliance programs frequently cite fines assessed against
Coors Brewing Co. and WMX Technologies as examples of self audits which cost
the companies dearly. Coors discovered that it was emitting a significant level of
volatile organic compounds. Although Coors' self-audit and remedial action
identified a previously unknown industry-wide problem, Colorado attempted to fine
the company $1.7 million. Eventually, the fine was reduced to $237,000.'
WMX operated a municipal landfill in Pennsylvania. Its audit revealed that its




307. Not all environmental attorneys favor internal audits. A number of corporate attorneys fear that
internal company audits can turn into "smoking guns" in court if they identify problems that need
correcting. Some view audits as guilty pleas. Henderson, supra note 26, at 157 (quoting from a
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL survey in which one third of the lawyers said they feared that internal audits
might be used in prosecuting their companies).
308. See Companies Say EPA Enforcement Policy Collides with Voluntary Audit Programs, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 416, 417 (June 24, 1994).
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fired the responsible employees and notified state authorities. Pennsylvania
rewarded WMX with a $4 million fine."
6. State Actions on Audits
In response to cases such as Coors and WMX, a growing number of states have
enacted environmental privilege laws. These state laws commonly provide privilege
for audit reports and immunity from civil and criminal penalties in some cases for
voluntary disclosure of violations. Fourteen states currently have such laws:
Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho. Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Oklahoma and
California are currently working on similar legislation.31
The EPA is vehemently opposed to state privilege and immunity laws concerning
voluntary environmental audits. To stall further state action, the EPA has promised
to lessen penalties as to those violations voluntarily disclosed by companies after
internal audits. The EPA has also threatened to withdraw from state control certain
state-run environmental programs as to any state which enacts a privilege and
immunity law.3 ' On March 27, 1995, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner told
the National Association of Attorneys General that state legislation to protect
corporate environmental audits from disclosure cause environmental programs
delegated to the states (e.g., solid waste management, waste water discharge
permits), to revert to the EPA's control. Browner went on to say, "I don't think that
would be in any of our interests." '312
7. Federal Action on Audits
Congress is now attempting to take the lead on protecting the confidentiality of
information obtained in a voluntary audit, as well as providing some immunity from
prosection. Senators and representatives in favor of a national audit privilege act
can point to a Price Waterhouse report issued April 9, 1995, which found that two-
thirds of the companies responding to a survey on environmental audits indicated
that they would audit more frequently if the results would not be used to penalize
them.
313
In the House, House Bill 1047 has been introduced by Rep. Joel Hefley (R.-
Colo.).3 t 4 In the Senate, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R.-Or.) and Sen. Hank Brown (R.-
Colo.) have introduced Senate Bill 582, the Environmental Audit Privilege Act."'
Both bills provide confidentiality for environmental audit reports done in good faith.
309. Id.
310. Number of States with Laws Granting Audit Privilege Grows to 14 with Texas, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 270 (June 2, 1995).
311. States with Audit Privilege, Immunity Laws Could Lose Delegated Authority, Browner Says,
25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2378, 2378 (Mar. 31, 1995).
312. Id.
313. Companies Would Perform More Audits if Penalties Wee Eliminated, Survey Says, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2447, 2447 (Apr. 14, 1995).
314. H.R. 1047, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
315. S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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The confidentiality extends to the testimony of environmental auditors. A
presumption of immunity is created as to administrative, civil, or criminal penalties
if a company voluntarily discloses its audit report to federal agencies. The EPA
would still, however, be able to take legal action as to information independently
obtained."6
Conclusion
This article is not a defense of polluters, who willfully, knowingly, and
egregiously violate our nation's environmental laws, thereby endangering the public
health, safety, and welfare. Such individuals and corporations are criminals and
should be prosecuted accordingly.
This article also is not an attempt to denigrate those government agencies and
individuals responsible for the enforcement of federal and state environmental laws.
Most of those involved in environmental enforcement activities are dedicated to
prompt results, the fair treatment of those accused of environmental crimes, and
equitable solutions and penalties.
There is no doubt, however, that the growing body of environmental laws and
regulations, along with their increased complexity and diminished mens rea
requirement for criminal prosecutions, can entangle and punish those persons and
businesses who would not normally be characterized as criminals. When otherwise
responsible citizens are stigmatized as environmental criminals and subjected to
fines and even incarceration, their initial disbelief eventually turns to contempt for
the law." 7
Individual contempt then develops into group contempt for the law as the public
becomes aware of questionable and controversial criminal prosecutions. Cases such
as the prosection of Taung Ming-Lin for allegedly killing five endangered kangaroo
rats and that of Bill Ellen for allegedly destroying wetlands, while creating even
more wetlands, severely damages public respect for environmental laws and those
who enforce them. Demands by enforcement officials that the accuseds deed over
private property or make substantial financial contributions to environmental
programs in order to avoid even more serious criminal penalties only serve to
exacerbate this lack of trust.
Those who oppose what they view as the tendency of the government to
criminalize virtually everything and to then overzealously prosecute trivial or
inadvertent environmental violations recognize that these prosecutions are
undertaken because the prosecutions are believed to be in society's best interest.
But, as C.S. Lewis observed:
Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims may
be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
316. Sen. Mark Hatfield, The Environmental Audit Privilege Act, 12 ENvTL. FORUM 21 (May/June
1995); see also James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for Legislative Recognition,
19 SETON HALL LEis. J. 119 (1994).
317. James V. DeLong, supra note 174, at 21.
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than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty
may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but
those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end, for
they do with the approval of their own consciences." '
Constraints on prosecutorial discretion in pursuing criminal actions against alleged
environmental violators are needed now. This is especially true since Attorney
General Janet Reno recently granted the ninety-four separate U.S. attorneys' offices
across the country even greater prosecutorial discretion in the prosection of
environmental crimes. In August 1994, Reno made what is known as a "Bluesheet"
revision to the U.S. Attorneys' Manual section relating to prosection of environmen-
tal crimes. U.S. attorneys' offices have broad authority to initiate and manage all
environmental criminal cases except those in the narrow category of "national
interest." In national interest cases the DOJ's Environmental Crimes Section will
serve as co-lead prosecutor." 9
This change significantly limits the role of the Environmental Crimes Section in
initiating and managing most environmental criminal cases. In particular, it means
that the EPA's evaluation and screening process in the case initiative report process,




The single most effective and dramatic reform of the criminal provisions of
environmental laws would be the elimination of the diminished mens rea require-
ment, either by judicial decree or legislative action. As a matter of fundamental
fairness, and common sense, a distinction needs to be made between those who
knowingly and willfully violate environmental laws, and, thus, possess the
traditional specific intent to engage in criminal conduct, and those who lack such
specific intent. At, the dissenting judges stated in Weitzenhoff. "If we use prison to
achieve social goals regardless of the moral innocence of those we incarcerate, then
imprisonment loses its moral opprobrium and our criminal law becomes morally
arbitrary."
32'
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